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PREFACE: 
This thesis is a survey of the foreign- policy of Benjamin 
Disraeli during his ministry 1874-1880, with special emphasis 
placed upon events in the Ea8t~ The main intention has been 
to discover whether or not the policies pursued by Disraeli 
in the Near Eastern crisis of 1876-1878 and the crisis in 
Afghanistan during 1878-1880, were part of one consistent policy 
and, if so, what the basis of that poliCy was. Emphasis has 
been placed on Disraeli's own. actions and opinions, rather 
than upon a factual account of the two crises and the com-
plicated international diplomacy involved in them. 
The great six volume biography of Disraeli, begun by 
W.F.Monypenny and completed by G.E.Buckle, proved to be the 
most useful and comprehensive source of primary material avail-
able. Extensive use was also made of the Hansard records of 
Disraeli's speeches in Parliament, T.E.Kebbel's two volUmes 
of selected speeches by Disraeli, and the Marquis of Zetland's 
collection of Disraeli's letters to Lady's Bradford and 
Chesterfield, also in two volumes. Numerous secondary works 
were consulted and of these the very detailed works of Prof-
essor ;<.W.Seton-VJatson and B.H.Sumner on the Sastern Question 
were especially valuable. 
ACknowledgement and tnanks are due to Professor W·D. 
-1v-
McIntyre of Canterbury University for his patient supervision 
and helpful advice. I would also like to thank my typist, 
Miss Valerie F. Harris. 
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THE LlBRARl' 
UNIVERS.TY OF CANTE'RBURY 
O :i,ISTCi !l;I,CH. N.2. 
CHAPTER I: DISRAELI'S FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1874. 
On 27 July 1837, Benjamin Disraeli was elected as a 
Conservative Member of Parliament for the constituency of 
Maidston.e. This was Disraeli IS fifth attempt to secure 
election to the House of Commons in five years. His long 
struggle for political recognition and power had finally 
begun. He remained a member of the House of Commons until 
1876 when he was elevated to the House of Lords as the Earl 
of Beaconsfield. During the thirty-five years preceding 
the election of 1874 the Conservative party held office 
only on three brief occasions: 1852, 1859 and 1867-8. In 
all three cases the government was a ~nority government 
dependent for its eXistence on the continuance of divisions 
within the opposition rather than on its own strength. 
Moreover, except for the few months between Derbyls re-
tirement at the end of February 1868 and the general election 
of the same year, the government was led by the Earl of 
Derby with Disraeli leading in the Lower House as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
Obviously Disraeli's political activities prior to 1874 
had been almost wholly confined to the opposition benches 
and Disraeli was the first English politician of real pol-
itical stature to propound and implement the view that the 
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duty of the opposition was to oppose and criticise the 
government in office. The singlemindedness of Disraeli's 
oppositio~ often alarmed his more moderate colleagues and 
annoyed the government pOliticians who felt that such 
unwavering resistance smacked of faction. Clearly the 
historian i6 faced with a task of some difficulty in deciding 
how much of what Disraeli said when out of office is an 
expression of his true political feeling and how much of it 
was directed purely at weakening the government and corres-
pondingly strengthening the opposition. There is no doubt 
that Disraeli's prime ambition_ when out of office was to get 
back into office as quickly as possible. Even before he had 
achieved any position of power at all, Disraeli freely ad-
mitted that he felt a politician to be largely "a child of 
circumstance l ' who should not be bound in office to the opinions 
he had expressed prior to gaining it. 1 Disraeli's rebellion 
against Sir Robert Peel on the free trade issue and then 
his abandonment of the policy of protectio~ shortly after, 
demonstrated that he certainly did not hesitate to shift his 
ground when he felt it would be advantageous to do so. 
Justifiable though this attitude may be in terms of realism, 
and of political commonsense, it provided his critics, both 
contemporary and historical, with a basis for the claim that 
1. Speech to electors, 16 Dec 1835, T.E.Kebbel, Life of Lord 
BeaconSfield, p.12. 
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there is really no consistent policy or political principle 
to be found in Disraeli's policies when in opposition. 
Despite this, it would be idle to suggest that a 
politici~ of Disraeli's mental calibre and experience had 
not, by 1874, given serious thought to the problems of 
Britain's external relations and arrived at some basic 
conclusions. Disraeli spoke quite of ten_ in the House on the 
various issues relating to the foreign policy of the govern-
ment and a consideration of his speeches and letters does 
reveal certain basic preoccupations. AdmittedlYJ the con-
sistency of Disraeli's thinking is not immediately obvious 
and it often appears that he was attacking the government 
with any weapon he found at his disposal. He attacked 
Palmerston for his jingoistiC meddling in the affairs of 
other countries but condemned Gladstone for his spineless 
foreign policy. He blamed the Crimean War upon the excessive 
caution of the diplomacy of the Aberdeen coalition yet after 
the advent of Palmerston he staunchly advocated peace. 
Some of his speeches criticising the policy of Palmerston in 
Afghanistan were almost exact replicas of speeches to be 
made by Disraeli's critics in the latter years of the 1874-
1880 ministry. 
Yet, underlying all this there was a certain continuity 
to his outlook. Clearly Disraeli was always preoccupied 
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with the belief that some sort of rUdimentary balance of 
power must be maintained in Europe if European peace and 
the security of British interests were to be assured. 
Secondly, the greatest threat to this balance of power 
would come from Russian expansion southwards into the near 
and middle East. Finally, Disraeli believed that Russian 
domination of the East would not only threaten British 
interests in Europe but also would endanger her Indian 
Empire and by 1874 Disraeli was convinced that it was 
Britain's overseas empire which provided the basis for her 
power, both real and apparent. 
British diplomacy in Europe in the thirty years pre-
ceding 1874 appeared to Disraeli to have fluctuated from 
one extreme to the other. On the one hand, there was the 
policy of Palmerston. Palmerston's point of view was that 
Britain was fitted by her traditions and institutions to be 
a natural guardian of liberty. But this liberty was not an 
affair only of Britain's domestic politics and she must see 
to it that British influence and strength were used to 
support her ideas abroad. This had led, in Disraeli's 
opinion, to a foreign policy which was at once both meddle-
some and unsuccessful involving as it did on a number of 
occasions British intervention in the domestic politics of 
another country. Speaking at the time of the Don Pacifico 
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debate which involved the question of the maintenance of 
the rights and liberties of a British subject overseas,. 
Disraeli claimed that Palmerston had lost sight of the real 
interests of Britain. Alone amongst the speakers in this 
debate, Disraeli questioned the policy of the government 
on the grounds of utility. British interests were always, 
to Disraeli, material interests and were, as he remarked in 
1878, "of that charac ter which are the sources of the wealth 
1 
or the securities of the strength of the country." This 
kind of interest had not been secured by Palmerston involving 
Britain in the sentimental cause of nationalism. The real 
interest of Britain in Europe was to maintain a balance of 
power. It was, therefore, to the English advantage that 
the north of Italy should belong to Austria so as to curb 
French Italian ambitions. Better by far that Sicily should 
belong to Naples than to a stronger power. So too should 
Schleswig and Holstein belong to Denmark rather than to 
Russia. Yet Palmerston had given all these up in the cause 
of nationalism. Nationalism was a force in which Disraeli 
neither believed nor understood. The futility of Palmerston's 
approach had been clearly revealed in 1849 when Russia had 
crushed the Hungnrian nationalist forceS. Palmerston had 
1. Speech in the House, 17 Jun 1878, Hansard, Third Series, 
237, Col. 3415. 
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refused to come to their aid on the grounds that it was 
not in British interests to risk a war with Russia. 
Palmerston did not even appear to be applying his principles 
of national liberty consistently. 
In Disraeli's eyes, politics and especially inter-
national politics, should be judged upon standards of utility 
not sentimentality. This did not prevent him from believing 
60me intangible factors, prestige in particular, to be a 
crucial part of a nation's power.. However, it was not the 
role of Britain to interfere in the domestic politics of 
other nations. It was misguided to try and set up liberal 
constitutions on the British model in countries where his-
torical traditions made such a government unsuitable. 
International politics, he perceived, were power politics, 
and power was the thing that mattered. A nation must 
possess the power to implement its policy and preserve its 
own material interests, and Britain should formulate her 
foreign policy with this in mind .. 1 
But this was not a policy of withdrawal from active involve-
ment in foreign affairs and the attempt of the Liberals under 
Gladstone to avoid as far as possible any international 
commi t tmen ts was as m1 sglJided as Palmerston I s policy. 
'. A .. P.Thornton, The Imp8rial Idea And Its Enemies, p.5. 
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I c-an never believe that the peac e of 
Europe is to be maintained by hiding 
our heads in the sand, and comforting 
ourselves with the conviction that 
nobody will find us out 
said Disraeli, speaking in 1848 against allowing Prussia to 
gain Schleswig and Holstein. 1 Rather, !lin the settlement 
of the great affairs of Europe, the presence of England2 is 
the best guarantee of peac e. ,,3 Britain must adopt the role 
of arbiter in international disputes to ensure that the 
internal balance of Europe, which was the best security for 
British interests, should be maintained. A position of 
isolation was quite obviously not a position of strength. 
In this she should act with France as an ally. Except for 
a very brief period following the revolution_ in France in 
1848, this alliance with France was a touchstone of Disraeli's 
foreign policy right through until the French defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870 eclipsed France for a while as 
an international force. The Crimean War, the sei~ure of 
Schleswig and Holstein, and the repudiation of the Black 
Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris by Russia in 1871, need 
not ha~e occurred if Britain had made it clear that she 
would intervene and that she had the power to intervene 
1. Speech in the House, 19 Apr 1848, W.F.Monypenny and G.E. 
BUCkle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, iii, p.185-6, 
(hereinafter, M & B). 
2. Disraeli usually talked in terms of 'England' in his 
speeches and writings but, of course, was really referring 
to Great Britain. 
3. Speech in the House, Feb 1849, K & B, p.187. 
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successfully, Britain's position should be one of neutrality 
but an armed and watchful neutrality backed by an under-
standing with France.. "A mediation of phrases lf would not 
suffice. 1 
Disraeli never seems to have doubted the direction 
from which the threat to European security would come. In 
the House of Commons in August 1843, he made a speech which 
is almost uncanny in its resemblance to the speeches he was 
to make in. office between 1875 and 1878. In it he stressed 
the threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire posed by 
the Russians who were expanding 8outhward~ If you lOOked at 
a map, he claimed, it was clear that the two strongest 
positions in the world were the Sound2 and the Dardanelles. 
As long as these were secure from the Russians tbe balance 
of power was safe. But if the present advance of Russia 
continued and she gained control of One of these pOSitions, 
the balance would be shaken. Should she ever gain both, 
tluniversal Empire" would threaten. Therefore, Britain must 
realise that her true policy was by diplomatic action to 
maintain Turkey in a state to hold the Dardanelles. Turkey 
was still a nation of "unequalled" resources and with the 
support of European diplomacy sbe would be more than equal 
1. Disrae11 to Lord Derby, 17 Aug 1870, M & B, v, p.128. 
2. This probably refers to the outlet of the Baltic into 
the North Sea. 
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to this taek. 1 These are very obviously the same policies 
Disraeli was to seek to follow when finally in a position 
to do so. Obviously this conception of the Eastern Question 
owed a good deal to the influence of Palmerston and this 
particular speech was made in support of him. At the time, 
the speech was considered remarkable only in that Disraeli 
had had the temerity to criticise his leader Peel. 
Disraeli's alarm at the consequences of Russian ex pan-
sion was not then something that developed with the Russo-
phobia that gripped public opinion immediately preceding the 
Crimean War. Neither can his insistence on the threat which 
Russia posed to the balance of power within Europe be dis-
missed as an appeal to public sentiment since his first 
appeal was made before Britain bec~e especially anti-Russian. 
Actually, Disraeli never eXhibited the viol~nt antipathy for 
everything Russian that characterised British opinion at the 
time of Crimea and again in the 1870's. Again we see 
Disraeli's enlightened conception of the role of power in 
international politics. He felt that Russia was acting 
perfectly legitimately in pursuing her policy of expansion 
and Disraeli made no 'bonee about the fact that he respected 
her power and intelligence in so dOing. 2 Russia was playing 
the game of power politics and Britain must play the same 
1. Speech in the House, 15 Aug 1843, M & B, ii,pp.179-80. 
2. Ibid, p.180. 
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game to ensure that Russian ambitions never threatened the 
security of Europe and thus, ultimately, the interests of 
Britain. 
As the 1840's drew to a close, Disraeli was convinced 
that the threat had grown stronger and that Britain would 
ultimately have to act. 'tRussia alone develops herself and 
will develop herself still more in the great struggle which 
is perhaps nearer than we imagine tl , he wrote to Lady 
Londonderry. He went on to say that, without English oppo-
s1tion, "there will be no repelling force which will prevent 
1 the Slavonians conquering the whole of Europe. 1t 
Yet Russia did not need to be checked by force. Disraeli 
was convinced that a forceful and sensible diplomacy by the 
Aberdeen Coalition which made it clear that Britain would 
not tolerate the partition of Turkey and would act in concert 
with France to prevent it, would have curbed Tsar Nicholas t 
aggressive policies. Thus J for Disraeli, the Crimean War 
was "just but unnecessary". Nonetheless, the Conservative 
party was strongly opposed to ~ussian designs on Turkey 
because if she sucoeeds in getting possession 
of Constantinople, we believe she will exercise 
such a preponderating influence in European 
politics as would be fatal to the civilization 
of Europe and2injurious to the best interests of England. 
1. Disraeli to Lady Londonderry, 30 Dec 1849, M & B, i1i, p.195. 
2. Speech in the House, 31 Mar \854, ibid, p.539. 
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With the fall of the Aberdeen Coalition, Disraeli could see 
no reason why the Conservative party should not prosecute 
the war and was bitterly disappointed when Derby refused to 
form a government. But the Russians needed only to be 
checked, not completely defeated, and following the fall of 
Sebastapol, Disraeli was adamant that the Allied powers 
should agree to the Russian proposals of peace. He feared 
that Palmerston would commit Britain to a new and even more 
costly campaign endeavouring to conquer the Crimea and drive 
Russia from the shores of the Black Sea.. The vi tal objects 
of the war seemed to Disraeli to have been achieved with 
Alexander's acceptance of a modified version of the Four 
PO.in.ts drawn up by the Allies and Austria at the end of 1854.1 
These involved the cessation of the Russian Protectorate over 
the DanUbian Principalities and over Serbia, the free 
navigation of the Danube, and the abandonment of the Russian 
claim to any rights over the Christian subjects of the Porte. 
Russia also agreed to the neutralization of the Black Sea. 
So long as the clauses of the Treaty of Paris were maintained, 
the threat of Russian expansion into Turkey and through the 
Dardanelles could not materialize. Disraeli, for the time 
being, was satisfied. 
1. Disraeli to Greville, 12 Nov 1856, M & B, iv, p.18.-
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Following the Crimean settlement, Russia turned to 
Central Asia to realize her dreams of imperial expansion 
and during the next twenty years swallowed the greater part 
of it. As a result, by the 1870's, the Br~tish were beg-
inning to fear for their ascendancy in Southern Asia. 
Friction between the two in this particular theatre was to 
culminate in the Second Afghan War. However, for fifteen 
years following Crimea, Russia did not appear to pose a 
serious threat to European peace. 
In 1870 the RUSsian bear smashed his way back into the 
European arena as a result of the Franco-German War in that 
year.- Disraeli, like many others, does not appear to have 
realized the significance of the meteoric rise of the German 
state under Bismarck. On the eve of the Franco-German War, 
he still seems to have viewed German power as something of 
an illusion. 1 Consequently, the· French defeat came as a 
shock and a setback to him as it meant that France would not 
be a very powerful ally for years to come. The Russians 
were not slow to seize the opportunity provided by the tem-
porary crippling of One of the Signatories of the Treaty of 
Paris and repudiated the Black Sea Clauses included in it. 
The balance was once again in danger from the East.. Russia 
was persuaded to submit her claim ~o a conference of the 
1. For example, Disraeli to Stanley, 21 Apr 1868, H &: B, 
v, p.85. 
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powers in London, but it was understood by all parties that 
the modification would be agreed to •. 
Disraeli never seems to have possessed the slightest 
dOUbt as to the ultimate goal the Russians had in view. On 
25 January 1871. he wrote to Lord Derby that the London 
Conference was bound to be unsatisfactory as "I understand 
we are to relinquish all we fought for, and because I am 
persuaded that RUssia will make another move on the board 
within about six months. 1l1 Speaking in the House a few days 
later. he claimed that the German victory had completely 
destroyed the balance of pov.'er. If Not a single prinCiple 
in the manaeement of our foreign affairs accepted by all 
sta tesmen for guidanc e up to six months ago any longer eXists. II 
The first result of this new imbalance had been the repudiation 
of the Black Sea Clauses but Disraeli made it clear that, in 
his opinion, it was not Russian control of the Black Sea that 
was at stake, but the city of Constantinople. Russia's 
policy in endeavouring to gain access to the sea was legitimate 
if disturbing, but her further policy was to gain the city of 
Constantinople and this was illegitimate. All that had been 
2 fought for in the Crime~ War was at stake once more. That 
Russia was bent on the seizure of the Dardanelles and the 
1. Dis'raeli to Derby, 25 Jan 1871, M & B, v, p.132. 
2. Speech in the House, Jan 1871, ibid, pp.133-4. 
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partition of Turkey as part of a policy of imperialistic 
expansion deliberately designed to give her dOminance in 
both Europe and Asia was to remain Disraeli's belief until 
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. It was, more-
over. a policy which posed a direct and very serious threat 
to the interests of Britain and her Empire. Not only would 
British interests in Europe be threatened by Russian hegemony 
in the Near East. but the security of Britain's Indian 
Empire would be at stake and, by 1874, Disraeli was co~ 
Vinced that India was the cornerstone of an. Empire upon which 
Britain's power and prosperity depended. 
As one of the more extravagant orators of British 
parliamentary history .. Disraeli always found the words "empire" 
and later "imperial" rolled easily off the tongue, but his 
conception of just what the value of Britain's overseas 
empire was to Britain changed very significantly during the 
thirty-seven years preceding 1874. Disraeli in the 1830's 
was a colourful~ flamboyant young man whose mind reflected 
his external appearance. It aboun.ded with colourful and 
romantic ideas but lacked the disciplined thought and 
steadiness of purpose which was to come in later years. 
The overseas empire of Britain seemed to such a man a glorious 
inEtitutlon preserving the greatness of Britieh historical 
tradition6~ If for no other reasons, the empire should 
continue to exist as a monument to the past. In 1833, Disraeli 
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feared the loss of "our great Colonial Empire" and hoped 
that some ItGreat Spiritll might arise to lead Britain through 
the troubled times and maintain "the glory of the Empire .11 1 
In one of the 'Runnymede' letters, published by Disr~eli in 
The 'rimes in the first half of 1836, l1elbourne was assailed 
2 
wi th "lounging away the glory of an Empire. 11 
The practical value of the Empire seems to have concerned 
Disraeli rather less in the 1830's, but in another of the 
'Runnymede' letters of 1836 he claimed that lIships, colonies 
and commerce ll were the basis of England's greatness and his 
'Old England' letters of 1838 called for Ita powerful colonial 
system, involving the interests of the merchant, the manu-
facturer and the shipowner.,,3 It does not appear that 
Disraeli had yet got down to grappling with the economic 
realities of colonisation. It is arguable whether he ever 
did, but by the later 1840's his ideas upon the possible 
practical value of the colonial empire had developed into a 
more concrete form. By this time the Conservative party had 
disintegrated over the question of free trade and Disraeli 
now stood at the head of the bulk of the party, as an avowed 
supporter of protection. Obviously he now sought to link the 
cause of empire to the banner of protection. Speaking at 
1. B.Disraeli, What is he?, cited in N & B, i, p.225. 
2. Ibid, p.321. 
3. ci ted by S.R. Stembridge, "Disraeli and Hillstones", Journal 
of British ~tudies, November 1956, v, p.122. 
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Newport Pagn-ell in mid 1847, he put forward a scheme of 
moderate but imperial protection between Britain and her 
1 
overseas possessions. In letters to Stanley at the end 
of 1848 he contemplated the idea of an Imperial Union 
between Britain and the colonies. 2 But protection, Disraeli 
soon discovered, was fast becoming a dead letter and he was 
far too much a political realist to waste time in the profit-
less support of a lost cause. 
When protection went overboard, Disraelils plans for the 
commercial integration of Britain and her Empire went with it. 
In a booming free trade England, the colonies appeared to 
contribute little to the prosperity of the country, while 
Britain's committment to defend the colOnies and colonists 
was a drain upon her finances. In the two minority govern-
ments of 1852 and 1859 Disraeli apparently found that the 
glory of the Empire faded before the immediate necessity of 
producing a popular budget. On 13 August 1852, faced with 
the prospect of having to support Canada in a dispute with 
the United States over the encroachments of American fisher-
men upon Canadian and Newfoundland fishing grounds, Disraeli 
Viewed the colonial connection with conSiderable irritation. 
in a letter to Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary. "These 
wretched colonies will all be independent too, in a few years, 
1. M & B, iii, p.24. 
2. Disraeli to Stanley, 17 and 28 Dec 1849, ibid, pp~33-7. 
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1 
and are a millstone around our neck." Later in the same 
month, following the successful conclusion of the Second 
B~mese War, Disraeli wrote to Lord Derby arguing against 
any extension of the Indian frontiers because of the cost 
involved. 2 
In a like manner in 1859, Disraeli proved decidedly 
hostile to the demands of the Navy for new armaments. This 
at a time when naval warfare had been revolutionized to such 
an extent by the introduction of the ironclads that all the 
navies of the world were faced with the task of rebuilding 
their strength from scratch, seems lamentably shortsighted. 
The fact that Britannia continued to rule the waves owed 
nothing to Benjamin Disraeli. 3 In 1866, again faced with 
the necessity of producing a good budget, Disraeli wrote 
to Lord Derby advocating that the Canadians should be given 
complete self-government and left to fend for themselves and 
that Britain should give up its colonies in West Africa. 4 
The letter was written. after an unexpected military drain 
had been caused by the sudden despatch of troops to Canada 
to protect the colony against a threatened Fenian raid from 
the United States. It reflects, more than anything else, 
Disraeli's irritation at Britain's rather one-sided relation-
1. Disraeli to Malmesbury, 13 Aug 1852, M & B, iii, p.385. 
2. Disraeli to Derby, 31 Aug 1852~ ibid, pp.397-8. 
3. R.Blake, Disraeli, p.395. 
4. Disraeli to Derby, 30 Sep 1866, M & B, iv, p.476. 
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ship with the colonies at this time whereby the colonies 
brooked no interference in their local government by Britain 
yet expected Britain to safeguard them against external 
threats and internal disorder. There is a striking 
similarity of tone between this letter and that written in 
1852. After long and frustrating. years in opposition, 
Disraeli found himself precariously in office and was desperate 
to produce a popular budget to consolidate the Conservative 
position. In 1866 as in 1852 and 1859, he allowed this 
consideration to blind him to considerations outside his own 
department. 
But in 1866 Disraeli was certainly not opposed to the 
cause of empire. In fact" at the beginning of the 1860's, 
Disraeli was developing an altogether different conception of 
the value of the Empire to Britain. Speaking from the hustings 
at Aylesbury in April 1859. he stressed the extra-European 
basis of power which the Empire afforded Britain. The day 
was soon cOming, he said, when the question of the balance of 
power could not be confined to Europe. The states of the New 
World and Australasia were already makin~ their inflUence felt 
while lIold Europe ll exhausted herself in wars. Britain alone 
through her overseas posseSSions, was assured of continuing 
power and influence. 1 Now Disraeli is evaluating the Empire 
1. M & B, iv, p. ·?3 L 
-19-
not as a commercial proposition but as a source of power, 
and he was astute enough to realize that these were two 
quite different things. He elaborated o~ this theme in 
1863 when speaking in the House against the cession of the 
Ionian Islands to Greece. The Itdestinies of the Empire lt 
he said, mus t not be Ie f t to "prigs and pedan ts. II This was 
probably a reference to the historian . Goldwin Smith, a 
staunch advocate of the advantages of free trade. The 
Empire had been created by men motivated by Itthe instinct of 
power ll and "the love of country.1I He went on to claim that 
there can be no question either in or out of 
this House that the best mode of preserving 
wealth is power. A country and especially a 
maritime country, must get possession of the 
strong places of the world if it wishes to 
contribute to its power. 1 
On 13 March 1865, Disraeli claimed in the House that if 
Britain were to quit Canada it would be such a disastrous 
step as to lead ultimately to "the invasion of our country 
2 
and the subjugation of our people. 1t Britain was now a 
world, ~ather than a European power he claimed in his speeches 
on re-election in 1867. "She is the Metropolis of a great 
maritime empire extending to the boundaries of the furtherest 
ocean rt with Ira greater sphere of action than any European 
Power. ,,3 
1. M & B, iv, pp.334-5. 
2. Ibid, p.40? 
3. Ibid, p.467. 
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This coordination of the interests of Britain and her 
overseas colonies represented a new conception of the Empire 
although this was not realized at the time. In effect, 
Disraeli was saying that while the colonies were dependent 
upon Britain both for their origin and their protection 
from external threats, the power that Britain possessed to 
protect her Empire was based largely upon the possession of 
that Empire. Without the Empire, British greatness would 
diminish for two reasons. Firstly, and most obviously~ the 
strategic position of the colonies and their potential 
material value as a source of wealth and resources, gave a 
very real assurance of the continuance of British prosperity. 
But this was not the only value of the Empire and in his 
famous Crystal Palace Speech on 24 June 1872, Disraeli 
attacked the government for "viewing everything in a financial 
aspect and totally passing by those moral and political 
considerations which make nations great. 1I1 He perceived that 
power on the international scene could not be measured purely 
in terms of tangible assets. The Empire not only made a 
material contribution to the power of Britain, it also helped 
create an illusion of power. By the possession of the Empire 
and by the discharging of her responsibilities towards this 
Empire, Britain assumed the appearance and prestige of a 
great power and Disraeli saw that there was in fact little 
1. M & B, vi, pp.194-6. 
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difference between apparent and effective power. Thus, his 
desire to preserve and increase the prestige and influence 
of Britain was not a matter of sentiment. In international 
politics prestige was a matter of very considerable imp-
ortance. Outside of open warfare, the power and influence 
of a nation depended upon her prestige and therefore, any-
thing which added prestige to Britain also added power. The 
essential requirement of a great power was to appear a great 
power. 
The Abyssinian expedition of 1867 illustrates the 
direction of Disraeli's thought at this stage. It brought 
Britain no commercial or territorial gains but the exped-
i tion IS rescue of a British envoy and a Bri tish Consul 
imprisoned in a nearly impregnable fortress in the middle 
of a half-civilized country, demonstrated Iia great nation" 
acting in a IIstriking and significant manner. IIl Writing in 
retrospect 1n 1875, Disraeli refused to review the expend-
1ture of nine million pounds for the purpose of the exped-
ition with regret because it "was a notable feat at arms and 
2 highly raised our prestige in the east." 
The two most often quoted statements concerning Disraeli's 
outlook upon the Empire are the Manchester and Crystal 
Palace speeches of 1872. These were made at a time when 
1. Speech in the House, 2 Jul 1868, M & B, v, p.45. 
2. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 2 Oct 1875, ibid) p.455. 
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England's free trade boom was beginning to falter, when 
foreign competition was growing and when there was a 
steady rise in unemployment. At this time informed opinion 
was swinging towards favouring the maintenance of the Empire 
and Disraeli was clearly trying to make political capital 
out of this. This is particularly evident in the Crystal 
Palace Speech where the Liberals were attacked for having 
deliberately endeavoured to bring about lithe disintegration 
of the Empire of England" and the Conservatives were 
associated with the cause of maintaining the Empire~ It is 
important to remember, however, that when Disraeli confronted 
his listeners with the alternatives of lIa comfortable England 
modelled and moulded upon Continental principles and meeting 
in due course an inevitable fate", or "a great country, an 
Imperial country", a country where their sons might rise to 
"command the respect of the world!! the ideas expressed have 
been formed during the previous thirteen years. 1 
If Disraeli believed that all of Britain's overseas 
possessions had a role to play in the balance of power in 
the world, the Empire was for him always divided into the 
Indian Empire and the Colonial Empire. The Colonial Empire 
he valued more for what it represented in prestige and 
potential resources than because he possessed any real 
1. 24 Jun 1872, M & B, vi, pp.194-6. 
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affection for the colonies or the colonists themselves. The 
realities of colonization seem always to have escaped Disraeli 
and in 1876 he still saw the colonies as places to which 
Englishmen went to make fortunes before returning to England 
1 I " 1 to set themse ves up in po ~tiC6. The colonies were exten-
sions of England overseas, inhabited by Englishmen who never 
lost their contact with the home country. The Indian Empire 
was something else altogether, something romantically Oriental 
and to Disraeli, something very much more significant than the 
colonial possessions. 
The romance of the East had enchanted the young Jew 
during his tour of the Mediterranean and the Near East in 
1830 and 1831. The glamour of what he saw completely 
intoxicated Disraeli and he formed then, prejudices and pre-
conceptions which were to remain with him for the rest of 
his life. Intensely proud of his Jewish ancestry, it was 
natural that he should find much to like in the Turks who 
treated the Jewish merchants with tolerance and even generosity. 
When considering Disraeli's stand for the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1876 and 1877, it is as well to remember 
that in 1830 he planned to volunteer for the Turkish Army to 
fight against the Albanians. 
India was part of this gorgeous East. Like Turkey, 
India was a land of ancient races and civilizations and to 
1. Speech in the House, 20 ~;Ll.I' 1876, 3 Hansard 228 Cols.293-5. 
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Disraeli she held infini te appeal. Th,e roman tic notions 
Dlsraeli associated with India appear in his third novel, 
Tancred, published in 1847. Fakredeen, a fickle Syrian 
character, advises Tancred, the English Prime Minister, to 
persuade the Queen to transfer the seat of her Empire to 
Delhi where she would find "an immense Empire readymade, 
a first rate army, and a large revenue. 1I He then moves on 
to talk of a vast empire including the Near and Middle East 
and India which he feels would be practicable. 1 
The course of his parliamentary career enabled Disraeli 
to gain a practical knowledge of the Indian situation to 
ally with his romantic attachment for it. In 1852 he served 
on a Committee of the House appointed to consider the system 
of Indian government. As a result of the knowledge he gained 
from it, Disraeli dissociated himself from the governmentls 
policy of leaving affairs in the hands of the East India 
Company well before the Indian Mutiny of 1857 proved he had 
judged the situation correctly. Disraeli attacked the 
government hotly in the House for jeopardizing "that wonderful 
progress of human events which the foundation of our Indian 
Empire represents. II He decried the spirit of vengeance 
abroad, insisted upon the just foundation of Indian grievances 
and advised that the relations between India and the Queen, 
as the symbolic ruler and sovereign~ should be drawn closer. 
1.. M & B, iii, p.44. 
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The obvious beginning of the line of thought that was to 
lead to the. Royal Titles Bill of 1876 also appears with 
the thought that "you can only act upon the opinion of 
Eastern nations through their imagination. ul It was under 
the guidance of Disraeli that the government of India was 
finally transferred from the Company to the Crown in 1859~ 
As Disraeli came to consider more closely the role of 
the Empire in the balance of power, both present and future, 
India appeared to him of ever greater importance.. In 1867 
he went so far as to suggest England was tlmore an Asiatic 
2 power than a European" and there is no doubt D1sraeli saw 
the Indian Empire as the most valuable source of prestige and 
material resourc es that Sri tain possessed. 'l'he brightest 
jewel in the Imperial Crown, India provided a foundation on 
which Britain's influence in Europe could be based. The one 
guaranteed the continued existence of the other as a source 
of power and wealth. In September 1866, Disraeli wrote to 
Lord Derby: 
Power and influence we should exercise in 
ASia; consequently in Eastern Europe, 
consequently in Western Europe, but what 
is the use of these colonial deadweights 
which we do not govern. 3 
Written at a time when the pressures of the office of 
1. M & B, iv, pp.88-92. 
2. Speech on re-election, ibid, p.467. 
3. Disraeli to Derby, 30 sepl866, ibid, p.476. 
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~hancellor of the Exchequer led Disraeli in a moment of 
irritation to express the view that the colonies were not 
worth the expense of maintaining them. These words provide 
a clear illustration of his estimate of the importance of 
India to Britain. At no stage in his whole parliamentary 
career did Disraeli ever waver in the belief that India was 
the cornerstone of the Empire and an essential foundation 
to Britain's greatness~ 
* * * * * * * * * * 
While it is impossible to deduce a detailed and con-
sistent foreign policy from Disraeli's occasional speeches 
and letters before 1874, it is clear that he did COme to 
office with a few fundamental preconceptions and basic 
intentions. He waq firstly, convinced that to abdicate her 
Imperial responsibilities and withdraw from an active role 
in European politics would lead ultimately to the extinction 
of Britain as a great power. JjI'itain must appear and act as 
a great power if she was to remain one. By her intervention 
in Europe she could secure Some sort of balance of power 
which would safeguard british interests and maintain the 
respect of the other European powers. Hy the possession of 
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a large overseas empire, including the vast, populous sub-
continent of India, she assured herself of the material 
resources and prestige needed to make her interventions in 
international politics effective. 
Secondly, Disrae11 came to office convinced that 
European peace and security was jeopardized by the imbalance 
of power in Europe following the Franco-Prussian War. This 
imbalance not only endangered British interests in Western 
Europe but posed a direct threat to the maintenance of her 
Indian Empire. Disraeli did not see this threat stemming 
from the new German Empire. He had greeted the outcome of 
the war as heralding a "German revolution, a greater political 
event than the French Revolution of the last century" which 
would invalidate the basis of previous foreign policies. 1 
But in 1871 Bismarck declared Germany a satiated state and 
Disraeli always seems to have been sure that the real threat 
was posed by Russia. He was convinced that if Russian 
designs on Turkey were not checked, Constantinople would 
fall, RUssia would become a Meditteranean power, and at the 
same time assure herself of virtual hegemony in the Near East. 
The domination of the Near East assured by the possession of 
India and political influence in Turkey, which was a basis 
of British prestige and influence in Europe, would be lost. 
1. Speech in the House, Feb 1871, M & B, v, p.133. 
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Britain would be left standing without an ally and isolated 
from what Disraeli considered to be the basis of her Empire 
in face of a massive and aggressive Russian Empire. Disraeli t 
in 1874, was determined that this situation would never occur 
and that Britain m~st be prepared to act positively, both in 
Europe and elsewhere in order to ensure that it did not. 
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CHAPTER II: THE EARLY MINISTRY: 1874-5. 
From the middle of 1876- until the end of his ministry, 
Disraeli concerned himself primarily with the question of 
foreign policy. Until the signing of the Treaty of Berlin 
in July 1878, it was the Eastern Question which claimed his 
attentio~. Following the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli's 
diplomacy took on a broader frame of reference,_ involving 
the affairs of Afghanistan" South Africa and developments 
in the Near East and Europe. These were "real politics .. 1 
worthy of the attention of a true statesman. It would be 
a mistake, however, to begin a study of Disraeli's policy 
abroad with the Bulgarian Atrocity agitation of 1876. The 
first two and a half years of his ministry also provided 
him with opportunities to demonstrate the new direction and 
firmness that he was determined to bring to British foreign 
policy. Moreover, the basic preoccupations which provided 
the guidelines of his policy in 1874 and 1875 were the 
same preoccupations which guided his thinking before 1874 
and were to determine the direction of his policy during 
the Eastern crisis. 
The international situation in 1874 was full of fore-
boding. On the European scene, France had sunk into a 
1. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 26 May 1876, Zetland, Marquess 
of (ed), The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield, ii, 
p.49., 
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temporary eclipse and Italy, although now accepted as a 
nation, remained a negligible quantity. Germany had 
assumed an alarming preponderance in Europe, all the more 
worrying because she was moving towards a closer alliance 
wi th the imperial courts of Austria and Russia. In Hay 
1873, a military convention had been signed between Russia 
and Germany. It was followed in June of the same year by 
a written compact between Austria and Russia. The contents 
of the latter agreement were somewhat vague and really only 
guaranteed mutual consultation on important questions of 
foreign policy. The immediate future was to prove that the 
new Dreikaiserbundnis rested on very shaky foundations but to 
outside observers in 1374 the grouping appeared ominous. 
Britain in particular, was uneasily aware that it gave 
Russia virtually a free hand in the East, and she could not 
help but view Russian activities there with considerable 
alarm. Russia had now restored her pOVler on the Black Sea 
and begun a menacing Panslavonic propaganda which had lost 
the earlier social and religious basis of the Panslavist 
movement and instead was beginning to stand out for the 
destruction of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires through the 
military might of Russia. Tsar Alexander and his Foreign 
Minister Prince Gortchakoff, were Western European rather 
than Panslavist in their outlook, but Panslavism had power-
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ful connections within the Muscovite nobility, the Orthodox 
church, the court., the diplomatic servic e and the army. The 
authority of the Tsarist autocracy had b€en shaken somewhat 
by the emancipation of the Russian serfs in 1861 and the 
Tsar was not always going to be able to ignore the sentiments 
of the Panslavists •. 1 To Britain, the threat was personified 
in. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatyev., the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople. A rabid Panslavist, Ignaty~v explained in 
his memoirs that he felt Hussian diplomacy should have three 
aims in the Near East: the revision of the 1856 Treaty of 
Paris to permit a collective guardianship of Turkey by the 
powers; control of the Straits and Constantinople; and a 
collective foreign policy by the other Slav states and Russia 
under Russian direction.. 2 
To make matters worse, Britain's position in 1874 was 
not a strong one. With the temporary crippling of France, 
Britain had been left without a powerful ally in Europe at 
a time when her prestige abroad was exceptionally low. She 
had been virtually disregarded during the Franco-Prussian 
War and, in 1871, had allowed Russia to tear up the Black 
Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris. To cap the situation, 
the United States had been able to secure fifteen million, 
1. For an authoritative analysis of Panslavism, see B.H. 
Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 18zo-80, pp.56-80. 
2. Ibid, p.74. 
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five hundred thousand pounds in damages from Britain for her 
negligence during the American Civil War. If Britain's 
apparent power was diminished, her effective military 
reeources were also depleted. Technical superiority in 
naval matters was lagging and little had been accomplished 
since 1856 to repair the inadequacies of military organisation 
revealed in the Crimean campaign. In addition, the Liberal 
government had introduced strict measures of economy in \868 
and in the following two years disbanded a considerable 
portion of the army reserves. 
When Disraeli assumed office in 1874 an uneasy calm 
pervaded the international scene but he was in no doubt that 
a serious confrontation lay ahead. Speaking in a debate on 
the question of Irish Home Rule in July 1874, Disraeli 
stated that he was opposed to Home Rule because he felt the 
need for a united people lIat this important crisis of the 
world - that perhaps is nearer arriving than some of us 
1 
suppose. II Despite a growing mutual distrust, Britain and 
Russia began in 1874 a genuine effort to improve their 
relationsa The Tsar's only daughter, Marie, married the 
Duke of Edinburgh on 7 March. This was followed by Tsar 
Alexander'S state visit to London in May 1874. Before he 
left, the Queen, acting on the advice of Lord Derby, the 
\. 2 Jul 1874, M & B, V, p~336~ 
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Foreign Secretary, expressed to the Emperor her desire for 
a frank and free exchange of ideas between the two states 
to avoid misunderstandings. This desire Alexander recip-
rocated. Disraeli welcomed this gesture only because it 
would give Britain time for the "settling and strengthening" 
of her frontiers. He had no faith in: "a real understandin.g~lIl 
with Russia as to British Eastern possessions. Trouble, 
Disraeli was sure, was on the way and it promised to come 
from the Eastern quarter.-
It is widely acknowledged that Disraeli did bring a new 
determination and a more positive approach to British foreign 
policy, since the days of Palmers ton. The Liberals, and the 
Conservatives when in office, had tended to drift with the 
tide of international events. With Disraeli comes the end 
to what Seton-Watson terms a "long and not very edifying 
period of isolation and non-intervention. 1I2 Although his 
old colleague, Lord Derby. was Foreign Secretary, initiative 
in foreign affairs came from Disraeli and his domination of 
foreign affairs increased as time and events proved Derby to 
be indisposed to pra~tically any form of positive action. 
By the time Lord Salisbury replaced Derby at the end of 
March 1878, Disraeli had become Virtually his own Foreign 
Secretary. He was determined to act positively to reassert 
1._ Disraeli to Salisbury, 2 Jun 1874, M & B, v, p.416. 
2. R.W.Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern 
Question, p.3. 
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British influence with Europe and to safeguard the Empire 
from the dangers which appeared to threaten. It does a9pear, 
though, that he was a good deal more sure of what he wished 
to achieve and the manner in which Britain should act, th~ 
just where and how action should begin. Except for a 
moderate increase i~ naval and military expenditure at the 
beginning of 1874, his foreign policy until the opening of 
the Eastern Question consisted largely of seizing opportunities 
as they arose. 1874 was a relatively tranquil year abroad 
and Disraeli devoted his attentipn to domestic politics. 
1875 and 1876 gave hi= more chance to demonstrate to all that 
there was a new and very different spirit behind British 
foreign policy. 
In May 1875 it appeared that Germany might wage a 
preventive war upon a rapidly recovering France to cripple 
her more permanently. The truculent tones of the German 
press made it also appear possible that Germany would make 
Belgian protests against Bismarck's policy towards the Catholic 
Papacy ~ excuse for ignoring Belgian neutrality. The 
Russian Emperor and Prince Gortchakoff visited Berlin at 
this critical time and spoke earnestly of peace to Bismarck 
and Emperor William. Disraeli persuaded Derby to associate 
Britain with the RUSSian mediation. If Bismarck really did 
contemplate war, and this has not been conclusively proved, 
he now reconsidered his policy and the situation calmed. 
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Visraeli was very pleased with the results of the British 
move. Bismarck in 1874 had tended to regard Britain as a 
somewhat negligible quantity although he was friendly enough 
towards the new government. visraeli at the beginning of 
1875 seems to have entertained hopes of some sort of Anglo-
German. cooperation in international affairs. In February 
he assured Count Munster, the lierman Ambassador in London, 
that he had never believed in France as a sincere ally of 
England and that lithe only people who could go hand in hand 
1 
were Germany and England. II Disraeli was well aware that a 
German alliance would make the future very much lese difficult 
for Britain. However, as the German menace to both France and 
Belgium became more apparent through March and April, he 
became convinced that "Bismarck is really another old 
Bonaparte again and he must be bridled. ,,2 To this end, 
Britain should construct "some concerted movement to preserve 
tbe peace of Europe ll and Disraeli showed again that he was no 
Russophobe by suggesting that an Anglo-Russian alliance might 
be tbe basis at such a movement. 3 
The outcome of the War Scare was doubly be~efic1al to 
Britain in Disraelils eyes. On the one hand it heralded the 
return of England to the European scene. Bismarck seems to 
1. Munster to BismarcK, 28 Feb 1875, Seton-Watson, p~11. 
Originally cited by W.Taffs, The War Scare, i, p.341 • 
2~ Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield, 7 May 1875. Zetland, 1, p.235. 
3. Disraeli to Derby, 6 May 1875, M & B, v, p-422 
-36-
have been surprised rather than affronted by British inter-
vention and addressed a letter of thanks to Derby and Disraeli 
expressing his pleasure that England was taking an interest 
once more in continental affairs. 1 On the other hand, 
Bismarck was not so well pleased with the well publicized 
claim of the Russian Chancellor., Gortchakoff, that he had 
personally secured the peace. Bismarck felt a public affront 
had been administered to him in his own capital and nursed 
ill-feeling for Gortchakoff that lasted through to the 
Treaty of Berlin in 1878. A split in the Dreikaiserbundnis 
had thus appeared as a result of the Scare while British 
relations with both countries had improved. Actually. the 
British action probably contributed very little towards 
deCiding Bismarck in favour of peace. Nonetheless. Disraeli 
can be excused for his elation with the rewards of his first 
real excursion into the European arena. 
In November 1875, Britain purchased forty per cent. of 
the ordinary shares of the Suez Canal Company. This was a 
sensational coup illustrating in a very favourable light 
Disraeli's boldness and ability to grasp an opportunity. 
Buckle is of the opinion that he had become interested in 
gaining some measure of control over the Canal early in 1874. 
1. Disraeli to Lady Bradford. 14 May 1875.- Zetland, it p.241 
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In April of that year Ferdinand de Lessepe, head of the 
French Company which was the proprietor of the Canal, 
endeavoured to raise the Canal charges in an effort to 
make it a paying proposition. He was induced to abandon 
the idea after the Khedive of Egypt, with the backing of the 
European powers, mobilized 10,000 troops to evict the Company 
if the charges were not lowered to the original level. At 
this stage, Disraeli tried to purchase control of the Canal 
from the Company, working through the private agency of the 
Rothschild family. Suitable terms could not be arranged 
and although contact was maintained with de Lesseps over 
the next two years nothing came of further negotiations. 1 
The opportunity to gain a Significant, although not a con-
trolling. interest in the Canal came instead from the 
Khedive of Egypt who held 177,000 out of 400,000 ordinary 
shares. Faced with finanCial difficulties, he was nego-
tiating for their transfer to a syndicate of French capit-
alists. Immediately he became aware of this situation, 2 
Disraeli was eager that the British government should step 
in and secure the shares. The Khedive gave priority to the 
French syndicate but it was unable to raise the necessary 
capital and de Lesseps was forced to appeal to the French 
1. Speech in the House, Feb 1875, 3 Hansard 227 Col.95-99. 
2. 15 Nov 1875 Lord Derby was notified of the situation by 
F.Greenwood, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, M & B, v, 
p~~. 
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government for s~pport. The French government refused to 
back the syndicate. France was still grateful to Britain 
for her flelp over the War Scare and the Foreign Minister, 
Duc Decazes, inquired what the British reaction Vlould be if 
he and his government sup)orted the syndicate. With uncharacter-
istic forthrightness, Derby replied that Britain lIwould 
certainly be opposed to these shares falling into the hands 
1 
of another French Company." The Khedive then turned to 
Britain and on 26 November the deal ~as completed at a cost 
of four million pounds. Parliament being in recess, the 
money was borrowed from the ltothschild family at two and 
a half per cent. until a parliamentary grant could be made. 
This Vias rather an exorbi tant rate of interest J being 
approximately thirteen per cent. per annum, and this particular 
aspect of the transaction was to be hotly criticised in the 
House. 
Everything had gone well for Disraeli and he was 
jubilant. He certainly did not prove reluctant to accept 
the plaudits he considered rightfully his. With a disregard 
for the true facts of the situation which is hardly credit-
able, he assured Victoria that the ~rench government had 
2 been "out generaled" and described to Lady Bradford the 
1. Speech by Disraeli in the House, 8 Feb 1875, 3 Hansard 
227 Col.99. 
2. Di~raeli to Victoria, 24 Nov 1875, M & B, v, p.448. 
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manner in which he had outwitted lIall the gamblers, capit-
alists, financiers of the world, organized and platooned 
into bands of plunderers arrayed against us and secret 
1 
emissaries in every corner." He was particularly pleased 
with the effect of the news upon Prince Bismarck and felt 
that it had shown both Russia and Germany they could not 
settle the Eastern Question without Britain.2 Whatever 
else happened, Disraeli obviously intended to act spectac-
ularly. 
More significant are the reasons which Disraeli advanced 
in the House of Commons for the purchase. By the beginning 
of 1876 he was increaSingly preoccupied with the steadily 
deteriorating situation in the Near East and the transaction 
had~ he felt, contributed significantly to the security of 
British interests there. It provided a further illustration 
to the powers abroad of the new purpose of British foreign 
policy and emphasised to Russia, Austria and Germany that 
Britain must be considered and consulted before a settlement 
could be reached in the Near East. But more had been 
accomplished th~ this. The Suez Canal, Disraeli told the 
House, was "absolutely indispensable" to England's political, 
no less than her commercial, connection with the East. 3 " ... we 
must look at it, not as a commercial but as a political 
1~ Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 25 Nov 1875, Zetland, i, p.308. 
2. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 30 Nov 1875, ibid, p.308. 
3. 8 Feb 1875, 3 Hansard 227 Col.54. 
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transaction.1t The purchase was, in fact, a real step 
towards ensuring the securi ty of the Indian Empire. II It 
will now be clearly understood that England considers India 
a vi tal part of the Empire l!, stated Disraeli to the House I 
and it \llould be c lear to all that Britain would not shrink 
"from any effort or any sacrifice that may be neces:;ary for 
its preservation. 111 In other words, by buying the shares, 
Britain had is;,:;ued a clear warning to Europe that she would 
resist any policies which mi;~ht endanger her interests in 
the East. 
Horeover, the Suez Canal Vias Gtrate<:;ica.lly a valuable 
link "in the great chain of fortresses which we posGess, 
almost from the metropolis to India. 1I2 Disraeli did not 
begin to believe in 1876 that Britain possessed a chain of 
l'1editerranean garrisons securing her connection with India 
through the Suez. This was something he had believed in 
for a conSiderable time. It was, nevertheless, a myth. 
Admittedly, Britain did hold Gibraltar, Halta and Aden and 
did exercise considerable influence in PerSia, but the 
distances involved made it a mistake to construe these 
possessions as piving Britain a line of almost unbroken 
authority from England to India. Right or wrong, however, 
it is important to remember that Disraeli did believe in 
the idea. The conception was basic to his conviction that 
----------------------------------,-~---
1. 8 Feb 1875, 3 Hansard 227 COIs.65-66. 
2. 21 Feb 1875, ibid, Col.100. 
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Russian dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would threaten 
Britaints Imperial dominion. Disraeli believed that this 
would break the chain tying London to Calcutta. The im-
portance Disraeli attached to the Indian Empire was under-
lined by another proposal outlined in the Queen's Address. 
It was proposed that an addition to the Royal Title was 
necessary to denote the new relationship between India and 
the English Sovereign since the government of British India 
had been brought directly under the Crown in 1858. Disraeli 
had insisted then on the importance of establishing personal 
1 
contact between the Indian people and their Sovereign but 
immediately after the bloodshed of the Mutiny hardly seemed 
a propitious time for this. 'l'he idea was not forgotten and 
Disraeli had mentioned it in a letter to Queen Victoria at 
the beginning of his ministry.2 He accepted the Prince of 
Wales' offer to visit India at the end of 1875 as another 
opportunity to personalize the relati~nship between the Crown 
and the Indian people and he insisted that this visit be 
associated with the Titles proposal in the Queen's speech 
so the two would appear as a "deep and organized policy.,,3 
Actually, the initiative for the announcement of the proposal 
at the beginning of 1876 came from the Queen herself. At 
this time Disraeli probably felt that external affairs were 
1. Speech in the House, 27 Jul 1857, M & B, iv, p.92. 
2. Disraeli to Victoria, 14 Apr 1874, M & B~ v, p.,457.-
3. Disraeli to Salisbury. 11 Jan 1876. ibid. 
-42-
suffiCiently complicate~ already, but lithe Empress-Queen!l 
demanded "her Imperial Crown ll • 1 Disraeli gave way with no 
great reluctance, expecting the Bill to pass easily through 
parliament. In f,act, it met with sEirited opposition both 
from the House and from some conservatives outside the House. 
Even some of Disraeli' s own party Vlere opposed to the move. 
Many felt that the new title would tarnish the grand old 
title~f King or Queen and others found unpleasant connotat-
ions in the title of Empress. 
To Disraeli the opposition had mistaken the intention 
of the move to extend the title. Speaking at the second 
reading on the Bill he outlined the government's motives 
more clearly. The new title would, he claimed, give 
assurance to the people of India of the esteem in which 
Britain held her Indian Empire. Some such reassurance was 
necessary at this time as the Russian advance in Central 
ASia was giving cause for alarm to the ruling classes of 
India. The Royal Title Bill would also give a further 
warning to Russia of the inviolability of India. Disraeli 
was careful to stress that Asia was "large enough for the 
destinies of both Russia and England." This conciliatory 
tone was logical enough if it is remembered that Disraeli 
still hoped to obviate the Russian threat to the Empire 
1., Disraeli to Cairns, 7 Jan' 1876, M & B, v, p.457. 
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by an alliance with her. 1 He continued in a much firmer 
vein: 
empires are only maintained by vigilance, 
by firmness, by courage, by understanding 
the temper of the times in which we live, 
and by watching those significant indica-
tions that may easily be observed. 
By adopting the title of Empress, the Queen would reassure 
the people of India and it would "be !J)oken in language 
which cannot be mistaken, that the Parliament of England 
has resolved to uphold the Empire of India. tt2 
Such a warning was necessary in view of the developing 
situation in Central Asia. Russian expansion had proceeded 
apace through the 1860's. One after another the decadent 
Tartar and Turcoman states which lay between Siberia in the 
North and Persia, Afghanistan and India in the South, were 
annexed. It was difficult for Britain to complain at this 
since Russia could claim that her expansion had a civilizing 
influence over her new territories and this was virtually 
the same argument Britain had used to excuse her own expan-
sion in Asia in the first half of the century. By 1874, fears 
were being held, especially by certain of the Anglo-Indian 
contingent such as Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere, 
that Afghanistan and Persia would also come under Russian 
domination. ThiS, it appeared, would put Russia in a position 
1. See Disraelils overture to Count Shuvalov, 9 Jun 1876; Seton-
Watson, pp.40-44. 
2. M & B, v, pp.465-6. 
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to exert pressure directly upon the Indian frontiers. In 
1873 Britain had secured an agreement with the Russians 
recognizing the Afghan frontier along the line of the Oxus 
river. The Russian agreement was due to a desire to secure 
a free hand elsewhere and in the following spring, Khiva 
was captured. Despite earlier assurances from the Tsar 
that the Russian intention was only to punish brigandage 
in the city, Khiva was annexed. These events were remote 
from Afghanistan but were still taken by many of the Anglo-
Indian Brigade to signal the untrustworthiness of the 
Russians and their dangerous intentions. Their fears were 
lent a certain amount of colour by the writings of certain 
Russian extremists like Terentyev. In his book, Russia and 
England. he claimed that in the event of a European war, 
Russia would be able to use her position in Central Asia to 
threaten India and alarm the British.' The Tsar's assurances 
of the innocence of RUSSian intentions appeared of little 
value as it was obvious that the central government of Russia 
had virtually lost control of the general staff in Asia. As 
the Indian authorities realize~ the fall of Khiva had changed 
the centre of gravity of Central Asian affairs from the 
mountains of Afghan to the Persian and Turkoman plain. The 
great fortress of Herat was now the "key" not only to 
1. For a fuller discussion of the anti-British extremism of 
this work, see Sumner, pp.41-3. 
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'twestern Afghanistan, Kabul and so to India; but also to 
Kandahar and the Per sian Gulf .11 1 
'rhus, when Disraeli assumed office, ctussia was established 
along two axes of Central Asian territory down to Krasnovodsk 
along the Caspian in the west and down to Bokhara along the 
Oxus in the east. At this stage, Persia and Afghanistan 
appeared the only buffer states left to British India and 
2 Disraeli feared that they too were "broken reeds ll • Salis-
bury, along with other sensible authorities, discarded the 
possibility of a Russian invasion into India through Afghan-
istan as impractical. However, Hussian ascendancy in 
Afghanistan would lead to a dangerous confrontation between 
:~ussia and Bri tain. Moreover, Hussia would be in a posi tion 
to place pressure on the northern frontier by encouraging 
raids by the Afghans anG by fostering revolts in Northern 
India whicn could penetrate into the plains. Memories of 
the Indian l1utiny were still very green after twenty years. 
Disraeli seems to have taken a similar line. He believed 
that Asia was big enOUGh for both Britain and Russia and 
there is no mention of an actual Russian invasion of India 
but he was convinced that Afghanistan provided a vital buffer 
between their different interests and guaranteed Indian 
securi ty. 
1. A.P.Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo-Russian Diplomacy 
1869-73", Cambridge Historical Journal, 11, 1953-5, p. 218. 
2. Disraeli to Salisbury, 15 Oct 1874, H &: Bt v, p.427. 
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Relations between the Amir of Afghan, Sher Ali, and the 
Indian government were at this time on a rather precarious 
footing. The Indian government had stood passively by 
during the 1860 l s while Sher Ali fought to secure his throne. 
Despite this, Sher Ali had looked to the British for a 
positive reassurance of the sovereignty of his state after 
the capture of Samarkand in 1868 by the Russians brought 
them dangerously close to the Oxus. Both Lord Mayo and 
Lord Northbrook as successive Viceroys had been in favour of 
giving aid to Afghanistan but the British Cabinet remained 
unalarmed. Discouraged, Sher Ali had begun to direct his 
attention more towards the Russians. This appeared a 
dangerous si tuation to Disraeli and he strongly supported 
Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, when he suggested 
that in order to reassert British influence over the Amir, it 
was vital that the Indian government should be represented 
1 
at the Amir's court. Lord Northbrook was again£t such a 
proposal as he felt the Amir would refuse to accept a Hritish 
mission and this would lead to an open breach with Afghanistan. 
Northbrook was to resign in November 1875 because of his 
disagreement with the policy of the Conservative Cabinet, but 
his point of view does seem to have made an impression on-
Disraeli. He remained convinced that Britain should act "with 
energy and promptitude in the direction of Herat.1I On the 
1. Disraeli to Salisbury, 6 Jan 1875, M & B, V, p.427. 
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other hand he feared that if Britain tried to force herself 
upon Afghanistan, Russia would be able to step in, osten-
aibly on Afghanistan's behalf. A "bona fide understanding" 
wi th Afghanistan would help "not only to secure our Empire, 
but to preserve their independence" but Disraeli found him-
self in an impasse as to how this was to be achieved.' The 
impasse was to be broken for better or worse by Disraeli's 
appointment of Lord Lytton as Viceroy in Lord Northbrook's 
place._ 
• * • • • • • 
It is clear, therefore, that in his first two years of 
office Disraeli did not lose sight of the issues which had 
been the basia of his criticisms of the foreign policies of 
the preceding Liberal government. His association of Britain 
with Russian mediation over the War Scare proved to Europe 
that Britain was now determined to act forcefully to safe-
guard European peace and British interests. The War Scare 
and the spectacular Suez Coup of the same year did much to 
raise British influence and prestige abroad from the nadir 
of 1 871 • Britain was now acting in the manner of a great 
power. Yet Disraeli also made it clear this was not to , 
1. Dieraeli to Salisbury, 15 Oct 1875, M & B, V, p.4"33. 
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mean meddling in the domestic affairs of other nations. 
When the chaos of Republican administration in Spain led 
to a strong move for the restoration of the Bourbons, 
culminating in the crowning of Alphonso as king in January 
1875. Disraeli persuaded the Queen that England should remain 
upon the sideline •. - Britain should ac t only when her own 
interests were threatened, but then she must act effectively 
and without hesitation~ 
For this reason. Britain must act in the East for the 
threat to her Empire there seemed to be growing. From the 
Ottoman Empire through Persia to Afghanistan, Russia was 
exerting increasing pressure upon the buffer regions Disraeli 
fel t to be vi tal for the pro tec tion- of Bri tain' 6 connec tion 
with India through the Suez Canal. If the connection was 
broken, the basis of Britain's overseas empire would be in 
danger. The purchase of the Suez shares and the Royal Titles 
Bill had helped in Disraeli's eyes both to secure the 
connection and to advertise abroad Britain's determination. 
to maintain her Eastern Empire whatever the cost. Coupled 
with the reassertion of British influence in Europe, it was 
now obvious that no settlement of the Eastern Question could 
be achieved without British participation. Thus, Disraeli 
could feel he had done something to prepare Britain for the 
crisis to come but he was still aware that the crisis had 
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~HAPTER III: THE EASTERN QUESTION PART 1. 
"I am persuaded that Russia will make another move on 
the board within about six months" Disraeli wrote to Lord 
Derby in January 1871 following the Russian repudiation of 
the Black Sea Clauses. It was not an accurate forecast. 
Although Russian activities in Central Asia and the 
increasingly militaristic overtones of Panslavist propaganda 
maintained Disraeli's fears of Russian expansion, the 
situation in the Near East remained calm for the next four 
years. Then, at the end of 1875, the Ottoman Empire, quite 
suddenly, appeared to be collapsing. The crisis Disraeli 
had predicted seemed to have arrived. 
The Eastern Question did not re-open dramatically. 
Revolt had broken out in the European Turkish provinces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1875, but such disturbances 
were not uncommon in this area as the situation was a 
particularly explosive one. This resulted from the admin-
istrative incompetence of the Porte combined with the very 
difficult social and religious cleavage: the subjected 
peasant classes were Christian in religion, their landowning. 
ruling class predOminantly Moslem. ~'riction was aggravated 
because the subjected population was of almost pure Serbian 
blood and possessed an abiditig hatred for the Turkish 
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nationality of many of their ruling class. 
Consequently, Disraeli did not view the beginnings of 
the revolt with excessive alarm. It seemed simply a matter 
of domestic politics which the Turks would be well capable 
of dealing with themselves, and when it was proposed that 
the Consuls of the great powers should be authorized to 
attempt mediation between the Porte and the insurgent chiefs, 
both Derby and Disraeli were reluctant to co-operate. However, 
the Porte itself expressly requested British co-operation with 
the mediation and Disraeli saw no alternative to consenting. 
He was not pleased, though, to be involved in a matter he 
considered best solved without outside intervention.' 
Disraeli's confidence in Turkey's ability to settle 
revolts by herself was rudely shattered in October 1875 
when the Sultan annouDced he could pay only fifty per cent. 
of interest on the public debt. With the insurrections 
spreading, and Turkey apparently incapable of coping with 
them, the whole structure of the Ottoman Empire was tottering. 
Clearly, the Eastern Question was re-opened, and this was no 
longer merely a matter of Turkish domestic politics. 
Disraeli was not sorry. The chance to play the role of a 
true statesman and solve the problem "that has haunted 
Europe for a century" clearly appealed to him. 2 He persuaded 
1. Telegraph to Derby, 24 Aug 1875, M & B, vi, p.12. 
2. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 3 Nov 1875, ibid, p.'4. 
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Derby that Turkish affairs should not be dealt with in 
Cabinet but by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
personally. Salishury was also persuaded to manage Central 
Asian affairs with Disraeli instead of wi thin the Cabinet •. ' 
Having assured himself of the initiative in Britain's policy 
in the East, Disraeli lost no time in announcing that he 
intended Britain to play a leading role in any settlement 
of the question. Britain's interest in the matter was not 
readily apparent in view of her geographical position and 
her comparative isolation from European politics in the 
previous fifteen years, but to Disraeli it was quite clear. 
Speaking at Guildhall on 9 November 1876, he stressed that, 
while the interests of the imperial powers in this question 
might be more direct, they were not more considerable. The 
Bri tish government was "de eply conscious of the nature and 
magnitude of those British interests, and those British 
interests they are resolved to guard and maintain. ,,2 It was 
soon to be clear that the British interest involved, as far 
as Disraeli was concerned, the security of the Indian Empire. 
Disraeli was not unaware that there were problems in· 
the way of Britain assuming the dominant role in bringing a 
settlement in the East. The Rranco-Prussian War had left 
Britain dangerously isolated and Disraeli felt a lack of 
1_ Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 4 Nov 1875, M & B, vi, p.'5. 
2. Ibid, p.16. 
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Ubalance" in European_politics since 1871 .. If Britain did 
not act with Germany. Russia and Austria-Hungary, they 
could ignore her because of her isolation. If, on the other 
hand, she chose to act with them, Disraeli felt Britain 
would be reduced to a secondary role~ There were two 
objections to th1s~ Firstly, it did not, as he informed 
'Queen Vic toria, "become your Maj esty" and, because there 
would be no counter to the interests of the Dreikaiserbund, 
, 
it could lead to wars "which are neither just nor necessary.1I 
Secondly, Britain would not be in a position to secure the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire in, Europe which seemed to 
Disraeli a vital security to the British connection with 
India. ThUS, Disaaeli feared that the defeat of France in 
the Franco-German war of 1870-1871 would I'ul timately drive 
2 the Turk from Europe." This problem remained with Disraeli 
until the signing of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. On the 
one hand, he was endeavouring to assume an independent 
British policy in the East which would secure what he felt 
to be Britain's interests in the East. On the other hand, 
Disraeli was constantly wooing one or other of the three 
members of the Dreikaiserbund because he realized that 
Britain would be unlikely to secure a lasting and favourable 
1. Disraeli to Victoria, 7 Jun 1876, G.E.Buckle (ed), The 
Letters of Queen Victoria, ii, -p.457., 
2. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 6 Aug 1875. M & B, vi, p.13. 
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settleme~t without the support of at least one other great 
power •. Disraeli's foreign policy until the Treaty of Berlin 
was designed with a view to the situation in the East. 
Throughout. he was always hopeful of an understanding with 
Bismarck, leader of the nation least interested in the Eastern 
Question. In June 1876 Disraeli even approached Russia in an 
effort to achieve an agreement over the Turkish problem. He 
disliked and distrusted Count Andrassy of Austria but over-
came this to make constant overtures to him throughout 1877. 
In the meantime, however, Britain had to act alone. 
The first serious attempt taken by the great powers to 
restore peace in Bosnia and Herzgovina was the Andrassy Note. 
This was drawn up by the Austrian Foreign Minister and the 
Russian ambassador in Vienna~ It was circulated to the 
capitals of Europe at the end of December 1875. The Note 
contained a list of internal reforms to be carried out in the 
rebellious areas in order to secure peace. Although approved 
by the powers and presented to the Porte, it achieved nothing. 
The situation continued to worsen and Serbia and Montenegro 
were now obviously preparing to come to the support of their 
Slav brethren. Tension was heightened by the murder of the 
French and German Consuls at Salonika by Moslems on 6 May 
1876. Following this, Bismarck, Gortchakoff and Andrassy 
met at Berlin and drew up a fresh Bet of proposals ~hich the 
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other powers were then invited to sign. This document, the 
Berlin Memorandum, pledged the po~ers in the last resort to 
reinforce ciiplomatic action by "efficacious" measures. 
Disraeli's attitude to these two documents is illuminating. 
He was exceedingly reluctant to support the Andrassy Note and 
only agreed to do so when asked to by Turkey. He refused to 
sanction the Berlin Memorandum at all and the rejection of 
the Memorandum by Britain VIas followed by the despatch of 
British warships to Besika Bay on 24 May 1876, ostensibly as 
a measure of precaution against the revolution spreading to 
Constantinoplea These actions have been strongly criticised 
on the grounds that they made concerted action by the European 
powers impos.-~ible an(~ encouraged Turkey to believe that 
Bri tain was prepared to suppor t her as in Crimea. 1 
A number of explanations have been put forward for 
Disraeli's policy at this time. Blake considers that Disraeli 
was annoyed because Britain had not been consulted over the 
drawing up of either of the documents in question and seized 
the opportunity to both "have a hit at the Dreikaiserbund, 
and to make an emphatic assertion of British independence.,,2 
There is a considerable measure of truth in this. Writing to 
the Queen at the beginning of June 1876, Disraeli described 
Bri Ush ac tions as having formed Ita policy of determination" 
1. Seton-Watson, p.35. 
2. Blake, p.588. 
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which would help to bring 
the preservation of European peace and, 
at the same time, the restoration of 
your Majesty's influence in the general 
councils whic~ for SOme years, has not 1 been so marked as could be desired. 
Disraeli was equally sure that Britain was a great European 
power and that he was a notable statesman. It was against 
his whole nature to play a secondary role in anything. 
Seton-Watson is probaUly also correct in attributing part of 
Disraeli's lack of sympathy for the insurge~ts to a fear of 
creating precedents for the Irish agrarian campaign~2 
But these provide only a partial explanation for Disraeli's 
actions. One cannot exclude as a basis of his policy the 
conviction that the Ottoman Empire provided a vital neutral 
buffer for British interests through the Meditteranean and 
Suez to India. Disraeli's suspicions of Russian intentions 
towards Turkey had not lessened since 1871. He was convinced 
that any intervention in Turkish affairs by Russia was designed 
to gain political domination over Constantinople and threaten 
the connection with India. Throughout the following two 
years, he believed that "the Emperor of RUSSia ..... and all his 
court would don the turban tomorrow, if he could only build 
a Kremlin on the Bosphorous.1I3 DisTaeli feared the Andrassy 
1. Disraeli to Victoria, 7 Jun 1876, Letters, ii, p.457. 
2. Seton-Watson,' p.22. 
3. Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield, 20 Oct 1876, Zetland, ii, 
pp.82-3. 
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Note might furnish a pretext for RUssian intervention in 
Turkey. The Turkish government was too weak, above all 
financially, to enforce the reforms contained in the Note 
in the rebellious provinces against the oppositio~ of its 
own officials. In any case, most of the reforms had already 
bee~ coaceded in theory by the Sultan. The danger was that 
after the Andrassy Note had failed to have any effect, "then 
Austria and Russia, who probably contemplate an ulterior 
policy or should do so, will turn around on the other Powers 
and say, 'The advice you gave has been rejected, you are 
bound to see it is carried into effect",.l Disrae11 was 
forced to sanction the Note by the Turkish request that he 
should do so. 2 "We can't be more Turkish than the Sultan ll , 
he wrote to Lady Bradford, but he was unhappy to be associated 
with any move which could lead to an infringement of the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Berlin Memorandum with its threat of "efficacious" 
measures appeared even more ominous. The Memorandum reached 
Britain in the middle of May 1876 and Disraeli saw it 
immediately as an attempt to draw Britain into a scheme 
designed to end in the disintegration of Turkey.3 He 
explained his view to the Queen later in the month, claiming 
1. Disraeli to Derby, 9 Jan 1876, M & 8, vi, p.18. 
2. Disrae11 to Lady Bradford, 18 Jan 1876. Zetland, ll, p.ll. 
3. Note for Cabinet, 16 May 1876, M & B, vi, pp.24-5. 
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that if Britain had supported the Hemorandum, "Constantinople 
would, at this moment, have been garrisoned by Russia and the 
Turkish fleet placed under Hussian protection." Thus, Britain 
had refused to sanction the Hemorandum. But, "Your Majesty's 
fleet has not been ordered to the Mediterranean to protect 
1 the Christians or Turks, but to uphold your Najest~'s Empire." 
In Disraeli's eyes, therefore, tnere was a clear link between 
the maintenance of the Empire and the preservation of the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in particular the crucial 
city of Constantinople. For a period following the Bulgarian 
Atrocities and again after the failure of the Conference of 
Constantinople, Disraeli found the forces of political 
opinion within Britain BO solidly arrayed against him that he 
was forced to entertain schemes of partition with regard to 
the European provinces of the Turkish Empire. Even then he 
would not accede to any idea which would place the city of 
Constantinople in the hands of another power~ The maintenance 
of the independence of this city, and thus preventing control 
of the Dardanelles falling into the hands of Russia, remained 
always the cornerstone of his Eastern policy. To Disraeli 
Constantinople, not Egypt, was "the key of India. 1I2 
This was a very dubious premise upon wnich to base his 
1. Disraeli to Victoria, 29 May 1876, Letters, ii, p.455. 
2. Hemorandum by Lord Barrington, 23 Oct 1876, M & B, vi, p.84. 
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policy. Constantinople is over 1000 miles from Suez by 
sea and considerably more overland. Salisbury's appreciation 
of the situation seems a more logical one. He concurred that 
the government of Turkey must not be allowed to come under 
the control of another stronger power, for Britain's road 
to India did indeed lie through regions subject to the Sultan's 
suzerainty, but felt that this did not necessarily mean that 
Britain was bound to uphold the Ottoman Empire. In Salisbury's 
eyes, the problem could be best solved by the elimination of 
1 Turkey as a sovereign state. Disraeli, however, insisted 
on seeing the fall of Turkey as leading to Russia placing 
direct military pressure on the Indian connection. 
If the Russians had Constantinople, they 
could at any time march their army through 
Syria to the mouth of the Nile, and then 
what would be the use of our holding Egypt? 
Not even the command of the sea would help 
us under such circumstances. People who 
talk in this manner must be utterly ignarant 
of geography. Our strength is on the sea. 
Constantinople is the key of India, and not 
Egypt and the Suez Canal. 2 
Critics might justifiably argue that it was Disraeli who 
was "utterly ignorant of geographyll as the march he feared 
would have been virtually impossible for a large expeditionary 
force. The real flaw of his policy though, is that it was 
design.ed to meet a threat which did not really exist. At 
1. Lady Gwendolen CeCil, Life ot Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 
ii., p .. 79. 
2. Memorandum by Lord Barrington, 23 Oct 1876, M & B, vi, p.84. 
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the time Disraeli opposed the Berlin Memorandum, Russia 
had no intention of seizing Constantinople. Later, during 
the Russo-Turkish war when the influence of Panslavism and 
of the military leaders was at its height, official opinion 
did incline to the view that it might be necessary to seize 
the city in order to force a settlement on the Turks. Ad-
mittedly, Tsar Alexander tended to vacillate somewhat in 
his outlook, at times appearing more aggressive and militar-
istic than on other occasions. Also, General Ignatyev at 
Constantinople frankly aimed at the overthrow of Turkish 
power in the ~alkans and at Hussian seizure of the straits, 
and this probably misled Disraeli as to the policy of the 
Russian government. But there was not a shred of evidence 
that Russia ever had any intention of threatening the 
British regime in India. The only Russians who ever 
suggested such a course were extremists, completely divorc ed 
in their outlook from official policy. Disraeli's policy 
in the Near East was conSistent and, ultimately, successful 
in achieving its aims, but it was based on a premise of very 
dubious validity. 
It would be unfair, though, to place the blame for this 
misunderstanding of the situation completely on Disraeli's 
shoulders. His own longstanding suspicions of Russia were 
constantly strengthened by the Turcophil reports of Sir Henry 
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Elliot at Constantinople. Elliot Vias surpassed in his bias 
only by some of his Consuls_ Holmes in Sarajevo, for exam-
ple, reported the Bosnian. insurrections as !Ian invasion of 
bands openly formed in Austria, Croatia and Serbia.ll1 
Much of the aggressiveness of Disraeli's policy at the 
time of his rejection of the ~erlin Memorandum can also be 
explained by suc.h misinformation. At the end of April, newS 
reached st. Petersburg that 'l'urkey was preparing to attack 
Nontenegro. The Tsar warned Turkey strongly against this 
and it appeared that the possibility of Russia playing a 
lone hand had increased. Disraeli appears to have been 
given the impression that General Ignatyev was trying to 
induce lithe frighten.ed Sultan to admit a Russian garrison ll 
to Constantinople lIand place his fleet under the guardian-
ship of Russia.,,2 Firm steps were therefore necessary. 
Disraeli pressed Derby to give secret instructions to the 
Admiral of the Fleet off Besika to warn any of the naval 
forces assembled if they proposed to violate the Treaty of 
1841 and enter the Dardanelles, that he was instructed to 
maintain that 'rreaty by force if ll-ecessary. He did not 
consider, as Derby did, that such instructions would lead 
to war. Rather, "it should mean peace not war. 1I3 If the 
1. Seton-Watson, p.29. 
2. Disraeli to Derby, 28 May 1876, M & B, vi, p.29. 
3. Disraeli to Derby, 31 Hay 1876, ibid, p.30 •. 
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other powers knew that Britain was ready to resist any move 
which threatened her interests, Disraeli was convinced they 
would not push the matter to war. Whatever happened, he was 
convinced that Britain ~ust avoid the policy of drift which 
he felt had led the Aberdee~ Coalitio~ into the Crimean War. 
By acting firmly and positively, British interests could be 
safeguarded while peace was maintained, and Her Majesty 
"restored to her due and natural influence i~ the government 
of the world.I,l 
Initially his policy &Ppeared to be succeeding. On 
29 May 1876 the half-sane, extravagant Sultan Abdul Aziz 
was deposed by his nephew Murad. The new SuI t~, wi th his 
minister Midhat Pasha put forward a programme of constitut-
ional reform and friendly cooperation with the foreign 
powers, especially England. As a result, Austria~. Germany 
and Russia were persuaded to withdraw the Berlin Memorandum 
and it seemed Britain had been right to wait. Disraeli was 
very p~eased with events and had high h.opes that a settlement 
could now be reached without the intervention. of the powers. 
Moreover, the great powers of Europe, when they withdrew the 
Memorandum, appeared to be following the British lead in the 
East. Britain was still without an ally but Disraeli felt 
1. Beaconsfield to Lord John Hanners, 7 Jun 1876, M & B, vi, p .. 31 
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certain the Triparti te AlliaJice was "virtually extinct." 1 
"I like the look of things," he wrote to Lady Bradford, "and 
should not be surprised if I accomplished exactly and entirely, 
all I intended. tt2 British influence over the other powers 
was restored at least for the moment and the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire appeared safe. 
Unfortunately, things now began to go wrong for Disraeli. 
On 9 June 1876 he approached Shuvalov with the view of 
securing an arrangement with RUssia over the Eastern Question. 
This was to inaugurate a "new policy", the basis of which 
was to be a mutual guarantee of non-interference in each 
o th er s Asi an in ter es ts .,3 By 24 June 1 876 Di sr aeli had 
abandoned all hopes of such an agreement. This change in the 
attitude he held was probably due to a report he had received 
in the meantime from Monson, First Secretary of the British 
embassy at Vienna. Monson, after visiting the scene of the 
insurrec tions, sent home a report claiming "had it not been 
for the money spent by Russia and by Dalmatian Panslavist 
committees upon certain influential chiefs, the insurrection 
would long since have collapsed.,,4 Disraelils reaction is 
not recorded, but for the time being he discarded the poss-
ibility of an Anglo-Russian alliance. 
1. Disraeli to Victoria, 7 Jun 1876, Letters, ii, pp.457-8. 
2. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 7 Jun 1876, Zetland, ii, p.52. 
3. Disrae11 speaking to Shuvalov, 9 Jun 1876, Seton-Watson, 
p.41 • 
4. Monson to Derby, 14 Jun 1876, Sumner, p~155~ 
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Th~s disappointment was followed by the development 
of another complication. On 30 June 1876 Serbia declared 
war on Turkey and the danger of Russia's coming to Serbia's 
aid and attacking Turkey immediately arose. However t Russia 
held back although large numbers of Russian volunteers did 
leave Russia to join the Serbian forces. By 9 July 1876 
Disraeli was confident that "the infamous invasion of the 
Servians ll would be over before the end of the month. He felt 
the other powers had held back from intervening out of deference 
to Britain and reflected complacently that IIsomething like the 
old days of our authority appear to have returned. lll 
His complacency was short-lived for, on 23 June 1876 
the Daily News published the first details of the horrors 
which were to become known as the Bulgari~ Atrocities. 
Unrest in European Turkey had spread to Bulgaria before the 
close of April and an insurrection had broken out in the 
mount~nou8 district of Philippopolis beginning with the 
massacre of a number of local Turkish officials. The Turkish 
government, with its hands already full in Herzegovina, appears 
to have been panic stricken by this further rebellion close 
to the capital. As a result, it enrolled as regular troops 
a number of Circassians who were colo~zed in the province 
1. D1srael1 to Lady Chesterfield, M & Bt vi, p.37. 
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and permitted them to deal with the predominantly unarmed 
and innocent peasantry as they wished. It is estimated 
that somewhere around 12,000 people were killed in the 
frightful massacres which followed. The lurid and exagger-
ated accounts of the atrocities in the Daily News had a 
tremendous impact on the readers of the paper. 
Disraeli1s reaction was typical. ae was reluctant to 
believe anything which might force him to_alter the policy 
he had decided upon and dismll..ssed the reports as being "to 
a great extent, inventions."l It is true that this attitude 
was in part due to the misleading impression he was given of 
the atrocities by Elliot. Elliot was ill at the time and 
tended to accept the Turkish accounts of what had happened 
rather than making an independent investigation. After he 
was aware of the facts, Disraeli complained bitterly to 
Derby that it was lIimpossible to represent the F.O, in the 
House of Commons in these critical times without sufficient 
information. 2 What I receive is neither ample or accurate." 
Despite thiS, Disraeli was never particularly concerned 
wi th the atroci ties as a crime against humani ty •. 3 Atrocities 
were lIinevitable in insurrectionary wars in such countries.,,4 
1. Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 13 Jul- 1876, 1·1 & B, vi, p. 43. 
2. Disraeli to Derby, '4 Jul 1876, ibid, p.44. 
3. 3 Hansard, 230, Cols. 1185-6, 14B6=T493 (10 and 17 Jul 1876). 
4. Ibid,· Col.1 186. 
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To Disraeli, the duty of the government was not to lend a 
receptive ear to tales of horrors perpetrated by the Turks. 
England's foreign policy was based, not upon sentiment, but 
the protection of British interests and the atrocity agitat-
ion did nothing to change his views on what these interests 
were. 
What our duty is at this critical moment 
is to maintain the Empire of England. 
Nor will we agree to any step, though it 
may obtain for a momen,t comparative quiet 
and a false prosperity that hazards the 
existence of the Empire. 
This should not he construed as a policy of support for 
Turkey. tllll the Turks may be in the Propontis, 60 far as I 
am concerned ll , Disraeli wrote to Lord Derby on 6 September 
1876. 1 No doubt he would gladly have consigned the Balkan 
Christians to a similar fate. The crucial thing as far as 
Disraeli was concerned was not to lose sight of the interests 
of Britain and her Empire. These were protected by the 
maintenance of European Turkey: they had nothing to do 
with the welfare of the Balkan peoples. 
Unfortunately for Disraeli, informed opinion in England 
viewed the situation rather differently. The press created 
a harrowing picture of a Christian people fighting a lonely 
battle for liberty against the infamous tyranny of the Turk. 
A wave of violently anti-Turkish feeling swept the country 
1. Disraeli to Derby, M & B, vi, p.53. 
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and an immense sympathy for the cause of Balkan nationalism 
was aroused. On 6 September 1876, Gladstone published his 
famous pamphlet,_ The Bulgarian Horrors in which he called 
for the complete expulsion of the Turks frOm Europe. 
Henceforth, Gladstone gave leadership and direction to the 
agitation and once again he. became the leading figure of 
the Liberal opposition in the House of Commons. Until this 
time, Britain's policy in the Near East had not been a 
party issue. As late as 3' July 1876, Lord Hartingdon 
had expressed approval of the broad outlines of the govern-
ment's policy i~ the East.' From now on, the Eastern 
Questio~ became a burning issue between the two parties. 
In heated debates, coloured by their personal antipathy, 
Gladstone and Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield and directing 
Conservative policy from the Upper House, hardened to their 
own views and became les6 susceptible to reason. 
Beaconsfield, himself, refused to believe Balkan nation-
alisrn was anything but a myth. He insisted o~ dismissing 
the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzgovina as the work of 
secret societies fostered by outside powers.2 It was an 
outlook compounded of a complete failure to understand the 
independent character of Balkan nationalism and inadequate 
and inaccurate information. Writing to the Queen on 29 June 
1. M & B, vi, p.38. 
2. For instance, Aylesbury Speech, 20 Sep '876, Seton-Watson, 
p.88. 
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1876, Beaconsfield claimed that the reports of the British 
Gonsuls provided "incontestable tl evidence that the insUl'-
gents were "simply an invasion of revolutionary bands
" 
supported by Serbia and l1ontenegro, acting lion the ill6ti-
gation. of foreign agents and foreign com~a.1 t tees. II He 
denied that the arch-Turcophil, Elliot, was especially 
. . 1 L d antl-Russl.an... abouring un er such poor sources of infor-
mation and, it must be admitted, believing to a large extent 
just what it suited him to believe, Beaconsfield was able to 
convert the atrocity agitation into part of the Russian 
menace.. By calling for the expulsion of the 'rurks from 
Europe, the l'enlightened publicI! had "fallen into the 
Russian trap .. 11 2 The activities of Gladstone. he considered 
almost treasonable and felt he was manipulating public 
opinion for IIsinister ends .. ,,3 
Beaconsfield was to remain convinced that. had it not 
been for the atrocity agitation, a satisfactory settlement 
could have been reached in August 1876 .. 4 By arousing public 
support for a policy which, in Beaconsfield's eyes, com-
pletely disregarded the welfare of Britain and her Empire, 
the leaders of the agitation had encouraged the RUSsians 
to believe that Britain would not come to the support of 
1 • Beaconsfield to Victoria, M & B, vi, p.35. 
2. Beaconsfield to Lady Chesterfield, 31 Aug 1876, Zetland, 
p .. 69. 
3 .. Aylesbury Speech. 20 Sep 1876, M & B, vi, p.65. 
ii, 
4 .. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 24 Sep 1876. Zetland, ii,p.75. 
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Turkey if she was attacked. While Beaconsfield was head of 
the British government, the interests of the Empire would 
never be sacrificed. Thus, Gladstone's policy could lead 
to war. In fact, the agitation did lead Ignatyev to this 
conclusion but Alexander and Gortchakoff both feared still 
that a Russian attack on Turkey would lead to Britain coming 
to some sort of agreement with Austria, thus rec£eating the 
Crimean situation. Nevertheless, the activities of the 
Panslavists and the sympathy of the Russians for their Serbian 
brethren were pushing the Tsar towards a more warlike outlook. 
At this crucial point, Beaconsfield was forced by the 
agitation to amend his policy. He could not ignore the 
feeling aroused for he was aware that the country, for the 
time being, would not support a war against Russia, apparently 
on behalf of Turkey. He was hopeful that the agitation 
would blow itself out fairly rapidly1 but in the meantime 
"we are obliged to work from a new point of departure and 
dic ta te to Turkey, who has forfei ted alae; sympathy ••• 112 
Elliot was instructed to inform Turkey that Britain would have 
great difficulty in cOming to her aid if she was attacked by 
Russia. 3 In a letter to Derby on 4 September 1876, Beacons-
field mooted the idea of a "solution" of the Eastern Question 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 10 Sep 1876, Letters, ii, PP.476-7. 
2. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 3 Sep 1876, M & B, vi, PP.51-2. 
3. Derby to Elliot, 22 Aug and 5 Sep 1876, Seton-Watson, p.62. 
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which he felt had to be achieved if Russia and Austria 
were not to go to war against Turkey in the spring. He 
was vague about the details of the solution~ his main point 
being that England should take the lead in whateVer settle-
ment was achieved. Only with regard to Constantinople did 
Beaconsfield put forward a definite plan of ac tiona IICon-
stantinople with an adequate district should be neutralised 
and made a free port in the custody and under the guardian-
1 
ship of England as the Ionian Isles were." If his method 
had changed, the basic aim of Beaconsfield's policy had not. 
The "key to India ll must be secured. A week later, Derby put 
the governmentts point of view more clearly when speaking 
to a deputation of working men. He pointed out that in the 
government's eyes the territorial integrity of Turkey meant, 
at bottom, the possession of Constantinople. "No Great 
Power would be willing to see it in the hands of any other 
Great Power. No small Power could hold it at all."2. Thus 
Turkey must be left in possession, of the city if British 
interests were to be safeguarded. 
The independence of Constantinople would, however, be 
jeopardized if Turkey lost her foothold in Europe for this 
would leave the city exposed to any threat from the west and 
Beaconsfield was well aware of this. By the end of September 
1. M & B, vi, p.$2.. 
2. Speech at the Foreign Office, 11 Sep 1876, ibid, p.63. 
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the atrocity agitation was beginning to falter and Beacons-
field was increasingly convinced that "'this outcry is all 
f'roth, except where it is faction .. II ' As a result, he was 
encouraged to take up a rather stronger position regarding 
European Turkey_ During 15-25 September 1876 a ceasefire 
was called between Turkey and the already badly beaten 
Serbs. Russia proposed a settlement involving the military 
occupation of Bulgaria by Russia, and Bosnia by Austria, 
together with a demonstration by the united Fleets in the 
Bosphorou8. Beaconsfield refused to countenance the suggest-
ion. The occupation of Bulgaria, "the very heart and most 
preciouB portion of European Turkey, with Constantinople 
almost in sight of the contemplated frontiertt was lOOked on 
2. by England's Prime Minister as a "real Bulgarian. atrocity." 
Nonetheless, Beaconsfield knew that a peaceful settle-
ment had to be reached before spring if Russia was not to 
intervene. This he was determined to achieve by any means 
save sacrificing what he conSidered to be the securities of 
the Indian Empire. On 17 October 1876, Beaconsfield suggested 
to Derby the possibility of an alliance with Germany to main-
tain the status quo generally; IIthis would make us easy 
about Constantinople.,,3 This idea was to be brought to 
1. Beac onsfield to Derby, 22 Sep 1876, M & B J vi, p.68. 
2. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 5 Oct 1876, ibid,. p.79. 
3~ Beaconsfield to Derby, 17 Oct 1876, ibid, p:ET: 
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successful fruition at the Congress of Berli~ nearly two 
years later but, as yet, Bismarck was not prepared to take 
any step which might weaken his bond with Russia. 
Now. Beaconsfield placed his hopes upon a Congress of 
the powers. As early as the end of May 1876 he had decided 
that this would be the "only practical solution in the long 
run" and envisaged Germany and Britain acting together to 
secure a settlement on the basis of the status quo. 1 On 
31 October 1876. Turkey was forced to accept an armistice 
with Serbia after Hussia had threatened to sever diplomatic 
relations. On 4 November 1876, Derby suggested in a 
circular to the powers, the calling of a conference at Con-
stantinople to elaborate yet another scheme of reform for 
the Ottoman Empire and to this they agreed. 
Unfortunately, the omens from the outset pointed to the 
failure rather than the success of the Conference. The Porte 
only accepted the idea after Derby made it clear that the 
al terna ti ve was a:-<usso-Turkish war in which it was unlikely 
that Britain would support Turkey~ Austria also demonstrated 
a marked lack of enthusiasm. Russia had begun a partial 
mobilisation of her troops on 15 October 1876 and in a 
speech on 11 November, the Tear stated that Russia would act 
independently if the powers failed to agree at Constantinople 
1. Beaconsfield to Derby, 31 Hay 1876, M & B, vi, p.30. 
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and to secure guarantees that the necessary reforms would 
be carried out. The speech was followed by the mobilisation 
of additional troops. 
Not unnaturally, therefore, Beaconsfield was determined 
that Britain must prepare for war while she strove for 
peace. As always, he was suspicious of the Russians rather 
than the Turks. He was sure the Russian ultimatum over the 
armistice had been designed as a pretext for war, and foresaw 
"endless chicanery on the part of Russia. II 1 In this case, it 
would not be wise for Britain to rely simply upon negotiations 
to secure her interests. "Nothing can secure the success of 
the Conference but firmness on our side and we cannot be firm 
unless we are prepared for the future. II Nothing would be 
gained with i?ussia "by conciliation or concession. 1I2 Only if 
Bri tain made it c lear that, in the last resort, S'he was pre-
pared to fight for her interests in the East, was Russia 
likely to be deterred from war. Speaking at Gu~ldhall, 
Beaconsfield put this view very clearly. There was, he claimed, 
no country so desirous of peace as England. Her only interest 
was the maintenance of the status quo in order that she might 
continue lito enjoy that unexampled Empire which she has 
built Up.1I On the other hand, her resources were "inexhaust-
ible" should she be forced to fight for IIher liberty, her 
1. Beaconsfield to Derby, 3 Nov 1876, M & B, vi, pp.87-8. 
2. Beaconsfield to Derby, 4 Nov 1876, ibid. 
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1 independence or her empire." Beaconsfield believed that 
the Crimean War could have been avoided if Britain had 
shown a similar firmness in 1853 and 1854. Whatever happened 
he was determined not to become another Aberdeen. 
Nor should British resolution be merely a matter of 
words. "It is wise to assume that there will be an invasion 
2 
of Turkey by Russia", he wrote to Salisbury. Accordingly, 
Beaconsfield pushed forward preparations for the defence 
of the Empire. Hardy, the War Secretary, was asked to make 
enquiries as to the practicability of sending a British 
force with the Porte's consent, to hold and defend Constan-
tinople, and a team of engineers was despatched to Constan-
tinople to investigate the necessities of the defence of the 
city and the two straits in the event of war. At the 
sam~ time, Beaconsfield was conSidering buying a port on 
the Black Sea from Turkey to prevent the Black Sea being a 
constant threat to British maritime power in the Meditter-
anean in the future. 3 The preparations were uphill work, 
for it proved very difficult to persuade Derby to contemplate 
the possibility of military action. Opposition ~om other 
Cabinet members was also growing now with both Salisbury and 
1. Speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, 9 Nov 1876, M & B, vi, 
p.92. 
2. 29 Nov 1876, ibid, p.103. 
3. Memorandum by~horne Hardy, late Nov 1876, ibid, p.102. 
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Carnavon expressing concern at the direction of Beaconsfield's 
poliCy. Beaconsfield was adamant however. A show of strength 
provided Britain's best hope of securing peace and if war did 
come, Britain would be ready to guard her interests~ 
Unhappily, Beaconsfield's hopes for a peaceful settlement 
were dashed by the complete failure of the Conference of 
Constantinople. Lord Salisbury was despatched with careful 
instructions whic~ Beaconsfield felt left no doubt "that his 
principal object in being sent to Constantinople is to keep 
the Russians out of Turkey, not to create ~ ideal eXistence 
for Turkish- Christians. ,,1 In fact, it was Turkish "chicanery" 
not Russian, that confronted Salisbury. The European powers 
had surprisingly little difficulty in cOming to the basis of 
an agreement. This was quite possibly due to Russia, repres-
ented at Constantinople by Ignatyev, realizing that Turkey 
would obstruct the settlement. In this case, Russia having 
agreed with the other powers, could claim to be acting for 
them when and if she intervened i~ Turkey. 
Turkey refused to adopt a reasonable outlook. Furious 
opposition to all European interference had been aroused to 
a dangerous war feeling within the country. Midhat Pasha, 
the Grand Vizier, proclaimed a new Liberal Constitution on 
the day the Conference opened, and henceforth claimed the 
'. Beaconsfield to Derby, 28 Dec 1876, H & B, vi, p.' 11. 
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Conference1s work was irrelevant and represented a completely 
unjustifiable meddling in furkey's affairs. Salisbury was i~ 
favour of coerCing the Turks, but Beaconsfield refused to 
en tertain this idea. ItEvery means of friendly influenc e and 
persuasion ll should be used on the Porte, but Britain would 
not sanction the use of force •. 1 Whatever Beaconsfield 
thought of the Turkish attitude, he was not going to support 
a policy which could lead to the Russian occupation of 
Constantinople. There is no doubt that this attitude, coupled 
with the sympathetic utterances of Elliot and the activities 
of British engineers at Constantinople, did encourage the 
Porte to hope for Britisa support. Nonetheless, it would 
be unfair to blame Beaconsfield for the failure of the 
2 Conference as Seton-Watson does. By this stage, feelings 
were too high on both sides for Turkey and Russia to settle 
their differences amicably. 
Thus, if 1875 had ended in triumph for Beaconsfield, 
with the Suez Canal coup, 1876 closed in gloom and disappoint-
menta Over a year after it had reopened, a lasting solution 
to the Eastern Question appeared further away than ever. War 
now appeared imminent between ~ussia and Turkey, and to 
Beaconsfield the threat to the Empire was greater than ever 
1. Notes for Cabinet, 22 Dec 1 ~'I6, M & B, vi, p. 1 08. 
2. Seton-Watson, p.135. 
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before. ~ritain now faced the prospect of having to secure 
the l1key to Indiatl and she fac ed this without the support of 
another European power. Beaconsfield's search for an ally 
had been persistent but fruitless. 
The situation at home was no less discouraging. A 
powerful current of feeling against the policy of the govern-
ment had spread through the country following the ~ulgarian 
Atrocities. As a result, at a time when ~eaconsfield con-
sidered it essential that ~ritain appear united in a firm 
resolve to support her interests in the East, his foreign 
policy was still being hotly criticized. He felt people 
were allowing sentiment to blind them to the welfare of the 
Empire. Even worse, divisions had begun to appear within 
the Cabinet itself. Derby was proving more and more opposed 
to positive action. Salisbury and Carnavon were increasingly 
disquieted by the direction of Beaconsfield's policy and 
were unable to agree that Russia did pose a threat to the 
Empire. On to~ of everything, ~eaconsfield was suffering 
a prolonged period of ill health. On 20 June 1876 he had 
wri t ten to Lady Chesterfi eld, lila haute poli tique is re-
freshing; worth li vin.g for .• ,' On 3 January , 877 he wrote 
in a very different tone, "I wish they were all 
and Turks - at the bottom of the Black 
1. Zetland, ii, p.54. 




CHAPTER IV:_ THE EASTERN QUESTION PART II. 
Following the failure of the Constantinople Con~erence 
it appeared almost certain that Russia and Turkey would go 
to war in the spring of 1877. In the meantime, both Turkey 
and Russia were still concerned to convince the world of 
their good faith and moderation. The Sultan of Turkey 
affected to put the new, liberal constitution into operation 
but as he haa dismissed. and degraded Midhat Pasha, the author 
of that consti tu tion, ,and appointed a. r eac_tionary as Grand 
Vizier, outside observers had little faith in his sincerity. 
Tsar Alexander continued to profess a desire to work in 
accord with the rest of Europe and inquired through Gort-
chakoff the intentions of the other powers now the Porte 
had refused their wishes. He wished to have this information 
Ilbefore deciding on the course which he may think it right 
1 to follow. 1I 
To Beaconsfield, it seemed Britain had a choice between 
two policies. She must choose between lithe Imperial policy 
of England, and the policy of crusade," he told the Cabinet. 
Beaconsfield himself was in no doubt as to what the wisest 
choice would be for he did not believe that Britain could 
safeguard the interests and welfare of its people by a policy 
1. M & B, vi, p~125. 
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of "sentimental eccentrici tyll. 1 Speaki'ng in.. the House of 
Lords on 20 February 1877, he claimed that there was "a 
deeper sentiment on the part of the people of this country" 
than "the humanitarian and philanthropic considerations 
involved in the Eastern Question.." This sentiment was "the 
2 determination to maintain the Empire of England. II 
In the past, 8eaconsfield had believed the Empire to 
be best maintained by the preservation of the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and this was the policy 
Britain had pursued at the Conference of Constaninople. 
However, the Turkish refusal to accept the reforms agreed 
upon. by the powers at the Conference had left Britain lias 
free as air,,3 to adopt a new policy.. Moreover, Beaconsfield 
was well aware that some change would have to be made for 
the anti-Turkish feeling in the country simply would not 
permit the British government to wage a war against Russia 
on behalf of Turkey. 
On 9 February 1877, ~eaconBfield wrote to Derby 
reviewing the prospects for the future. He was still hope-
ful that a peaceful settlement was possible for he inter-
preted the readiness of the Russians to come to an agreement 
at Constantinople as a sign of weakness~ Sure that Russia 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 23 Mar 1877, Letters, ii, p.525. 
2. M & B, vi, p122. 
3. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 29 (?) January 1877, ibid, p.117. 
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fel t a war with '£urkey would be "materially disastrous" to 
her, Beaconsfield claimed that Russia would be only too 
glad to extricate herself peacefully. Beaconsfield saw 
Bismarck as the real danger to peace, suspecting that he was 
deliberately trying to manoeuvre Russia into war.' In actual 
fact, Bismarck's sole i~tere6t in the Eastern Question was 
that it should be solved as quickly as possible in order to 
avoid a quarrel springing up between Austria and Russia 
which might force Germany to choose between her two allies. 
Nonetheless, it was these suspicions which led Beaconsfield 
to approach Shuvalov towards the end of February 1877. He 
assured him of Britain's good will towards Russia and agreed 
that the days of the Ottoman Empire were numbered but asked 
the ~ussians to give the Turks a little more time to imple-
ment the reforms. The collapse of the Porte WOUld, he said, 
lead to a general European war and the Ottoman Empire should 
2 
not be forced to fall at this time. 
Beaconsfield's overture encouraged the Tsar and Gortchakoff 
to send General Ignatyev to the west on a special mission. 
He toured Berlin, PariS, Vienna and London in March and in 
each proposed that the powers should act together to force the 
Turks to demobilize and to supervise the execution of a pro-
gramme of reforms in European Turkey. Beaconsfield greeted 
1. Beaconsfield to Derby, 9 Feb 1877, M & B, vi, p~126. 
2. Seton-Watson, p.159. 
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Ignatyev's arrival in London with considerable alarm. 1 To 
British opinion, Ignatyev personified the militaristic Pan-
slav outlook which conflicted with British policY'ia the 
Near East. Despite this, the Cabinet approved a modified 
version of Ignatyev's circular, the London Protocol, but 
insisted that the agreement would be null and void if Russia 
did not disarm at the same time as Turkey. In. Seton-Watson's 
opinion, Beaconsfield was only brought to consider the 
Protocol acceptable by a forcible warning from Salisbury of 
the dangers of Britain being left isolated if he refused to 
do 2 Beaconsfield's chief objection to the agreement, 80. 
however, was that it was just too good to be true. At the 
end of March he wrote to Lady Chesterfield: 
I think affairs look' well and should be 
more certain did they not seem incredible. 
In fact Russia has surrendered at dis-
cretion and England has completely triumphed 
in her main30b j ect: prevented the invasion of Turkey. 
In a letter to 3alisbury he admitted that he could not under-
stand the II triumph" of Britain and the "humiliation" of Russia •. 4 
Beaconsfield did not have long to muse upon England's 
good fortUne. On 9 April 1877 Turkey formally rejected the 
Protocol and on 24 April the 'rsar declared war on Turkey. It 
1. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 16 Mar 1877, Zetland, ii,. p.108. 
2. Seton-Watson, p.163i 0alisbury to Beaconsfield, 12 Mar 
1877, Cecil, ii, p.131. 
3. Beaconsfield to Lady Chesterfield, 31 Mar 1877, Zetland, 
ii, p.l11. 
4. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 1 Apr 1877, N & B, vi, p.131. 
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the outbreak of war came as a disappointment to Beaconsfield, 
it certainly did not come as a surprise. Since the failure 
of the Conference he had been considering how Britain's 
interests could be best secured in the event of this war. 
Beaconsfield possessed no illusions as to the military strength 
of Turkey and felt at this stage that war would probably lead 
to partition. "In that case ll he told Derby, IIwe must have 
a deciaed course and seize at the fitting time, what is 
necessary for the security of our J:!.:lnpire.,.l orhe change in 
Beaconsfield's policy from supporting the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire to entertaining schemes of 
partition is more apparent than real. To declare the main-
tenance of the Porte a vital British interest would lead 
Britain into a war with Russia which even Beaconsfield's 
own Cabinet would not support. Thus, he had no alternative 
but to accept that partition might be inevitable. For a 
period immediately following the Bulgarian Atrocities, he 
had been forced to adopt a similar standpoint. But then as 
now, the basic purpose of Beaconsfield's Eastern policy had 
remained unaltered: the safeguarding of Britain's connection 
with her Empire through Suez and the Middle East. Nor had he 
changed in his belief that the security of this connection 
depended on the independence of Constantinople and the freedom 
1. Beaconsfield to Derby, 9 Feb 1877, M & B, vi, p.126.-
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of the Straits from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. 
Following the Turkish refusal of the London Protocol, 
Beaconsfield felt the Cabinet must agree on their "decided 
course" without delay. On 21 April 1877 he proposed to the 
Cabinet that Britain should occupy the Dardanelles lias a 
material guarantee against RUssia seizing Constantinople ,II 
Britain would retire from the Dardanelles when a treaty of 
peace was concluded "which would secure the. requisi te balance 
1 
of power. II Beaconsfield did not view this as an. unduly 
aggressive policy. He was convinced not only that Britain 
must assume a "commanding position" if her interests were to 
be secure, but also that firmness on the part of Britain 
was more llkely to deter Russia from steps which might lead 
to war with Britain than Derby's policy of non-involvement. 
Seven of the Cabinet, including Derby, Salisbury and Carnavon, 
remained opposed to any military committment on the part of 
Britain2 and Beaconsfield could not persuade them otherwise. 
At the very least, Beaconsfield considered it imperative 
that Russia should be made aware of just what Britain COD-
ceived her interests in the Eastern Question to be. He 
wished the Cabinet to warn Russia that the occupation of 
Constantinople, an attack on Egypt or the obstruction of the 
1. Secret Memorandum, 23 Apr 1877, Letters, ii, p.530. 
2. Memorandum of Sir Stafford Northcote,. M & Bt vi, p.139. 
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Dardanelles would constitute a casus belli for Britain •. 
On 6 May 1877. Derby despatched a Note to Russia warning 
her that British neutrality was conditional on these interests 
not being threatened. To Beaconsfield, this was to remain 
lithe charter of our policy with regard to the Eastern Quest-
ion,1I 1 and he did not intend the warning contained in the 
Note to be an empty threat._ The Russian response to the 
Note was friendly, and Gortchakoff promised that Russia 
would respect Bri tish interests. Russia, in the meantime 
however, appeared to be sweeping the Turkish opposition 
before her and Beaconsfield's suspicions of Russian intentions 
were too longstanding for him not to feel that Britain would 
sooner or later have to abandon her position of watchful 
neutrality. After all, in 1873 Russia had promised equally 
faithfully that she would have no intention of annexing 
Turkestan but had then done so. 
Convinced as he was that Britain would sooner or later 
have to act, and act forcefully, to protect her imperial 
interests, Britain's isolation was continually disturbing 
to Beaconsfield. It was a situation he was concerned to 
remedy throughout 1877 and the early months of 1878 by an 
alliance with Austria-Hungary. His distrust of Bismarck 
at this stage discouraged him from continuing to seek common 
1. Speech on the res~~nation of Derby and_ Carnavon, 25 Jan 
1878, Hansard ~311 446. 
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action by Germany and Bri tain in the East. . In this case 
Austria was the only real alternative and it appeared to 
Beaconsfield the two nations had common interests in the 
Near East which could form the basis of an alliance. It 
was obviously in Austrian interests too, that Russian 
hegemony should not be established in the Balkans and that 
Russia should not occupy Constantinople or gain control of 
the Dardanelles. Unfortunately, Russia had already taken 
steps to protect herself from a flank attack from the 
Balkans~ On 15 January 1877 a secret agreement had been 
signed by Austria and Russia delimiting their spheres of 
interest in the Balkans, and specifying the terms on which 
Austria would consent to remain neutral if Russia invaded 
Turkey. Bec.ause of their political rivalry, Count Andrassy 
did not inform the Austrian ambassador in London, Count 
Beust, of what had occurred. As a result, Beaconsfield 
knew nothing of the agreement until later in 1877 and when 
1 he was informed of it by Shuvalov, was reluctant to believe 
the Russian, continuing his advances to Austria. If Britain 
was to act, she would have to do 60 alone. 
By the middle of June the Russians t inexorable advance 
was still continuing and Beaconsfield was becoming more con-
vinced than ever that Britain should take more positive 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 10 Oct 1877, M & B, vi, p.186. 
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action than lithe paralysing neutrality in. vogue,,1 to counter-
act the Russian. menace. His growing disquiet was not without 
justification. At this time there was a considerable struggle 
in Russia between the moderate influences led by Shuvalov and 
Gortchakoff, and the more extreme views of the Panslavs and 
the military leaders, for control of Russia's foreign policy. 
Moderate opinion wished to end the war quickly and to create 
an autonomous Bulgaria which would not extend south of the 
Balkan moun.tains. They hoped Britain would remain neutral in 
return. An agreement along these lines with provision for 
Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina was suggested to the 
British government by Gortchakoff on 31 t·1ay 1877. However, 
the proposal was withdrawn within. a few days and on. 14 June 
1877 it was announ.ced that the new Bulgaria must extend south 
as well as north of the Balkans. From this time until April 
1878, the Panslavists, represented by General Ignatyev and 
the military commanders, were able to give the Tsar's policy 
much greater aggressiveness than it had previously possessed. 
To Beaconsfield, the withdrawal of Gortchakoff1s offer 
confirmed all his worst 6uspicions of HU6sia. He had already 
suggested to Layard on 6 June 1877 that the Sultan might be 
persuaded to invite the British fleet to Constantinople and 
allow a military occupation of Gallipoli by Britain. This 
1. Beaconsfield to Layard, 6 Jun 1877, M & B, vi, p.142. 
-87-
would provide the "material guarantee" which Beaconsfield 
had always wanted, to ensure the maintenance of the status 
quo with regard to Constantinople and the Straits, and 
Britain would be able to ensure her interests were safe-
guarded when peace was negotiated. 1 On 13 June 1877 Derby, 
at the behest of his colleagues, proposed an lIactive alliance" 
to Count Beust. Nothing substantial came ,of Beaconsfield's 
attempt to persuade the Cabinet to adopt a firmer tone. 
'fhe whole Cabinet, with the exception of Lord John Manners, 
opposed the Gallipoli expedition,2 forcing Beaconsfield to 
abandon the idea, and the Austrian reply to Derby's overture was 
very non-committal. The progress of war during June did 
strengthen Beaconsfield's hand against his dissentient coll-
eagues to a certain extent. Early in July 1877 the Russians 
gained control of two of the pas3es through the Balkans and it 
began to appear likely that the Russians might reach Cons tan-
tinople. The Cabinet did agree to despatch a further Note 
warning Russia of the serious consequences which could follow 
the occupation of Constantinople~ 
However, this decision fell far short of what Beacons-
field desired and he was increasingly frustrated by the 
opposition he faced within his Cabinet. It did not seem to 
1. Beaconsfield to Layard, 6 Jun 1877, 1-1 & B, vi, p.142. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 16 Jul 1877, ibid, pp.151-2. 
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him that the policy he had advocated was unnecessarily war-
like. Explaining his policy to the Queen on 16 July 1877, 
Beaconsfield pointed out that he had aVOided adVising the 
occupation
' 
of Constantinople itself because such a step 
must involve Britain in a war with Russia. He had advocated 
instead the occupation of the Dard~lles which he felt 
would provide sufficient assurance that Britain could achieve 
the restoration of Constantinople at the end of the war if it 
was occupied by the Russians. But some positive action was 
vital if Britain wished to mainta1.n "her present position 
in the Meditteranean. 1t2 As far as Beaconsfield was con-cerned, 
this was a vital imperial interest and must be secured what-
ever the cost. He did not think that a British expedition 
to the Stra1.ts would lead to war. Rather, he felt it would 
provide the best chance of a peaceful settlement. On the 
other hand, if war was necessary for the security of the 
Empire, Britain must be prepared to make the sacrifice of 
fighting for her possessions. 
Lord Beaconsfield hopes that the great 
objects of your Majesty's imperial policy 
may be secured without going to war; but 
if war is necessary he will not shrink 
from adVising Your Majesty to declare it.3 
On 21 July 1877, Beaconsfield persuaded the Cabinet 
1. Beaconsfield speaks often of the "occupation" of the penin-
sula, but it does not appear that he meant anything more 
than the presence of troops. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 16 Jul 1877, M & B, vi, pp.151-2. 
3. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 29 Jul 1877, ibid, p.158. 
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Britain should declare war on Russia if Russia occupied 
Constantinople and did not arrange to retire from it in 
the immediate future. In fighting such a war, Beaconsfield 
believed, Britain would be fighting in defence of her 
Indian Empire and he dreamed of the Empire contributing 
to its own defence. If war should be declared, he told the 
Queen the day after the Cabinet decision, lithe Empress of 
India should order her armies to clear Central Asia of the 
Muscovites and drive them into the Caspian; we have a good 
instrument for this purpose in Lord Lytton and indeed he was 
placed there with that in view. lIl Such a campaign was com-
pletely impractical considering the terrain and distances 
involved. Beaconsfield's suggestion of it suggests there was 
more than a little justification behind Salisbury's complaint 
that Beaconsfield often misread the situation by relying on 
maps of too small a scale.2 Other rather grandiose plans of 
campaign appear in Beaconsfield's writings at this time. For 
example, he suggested to the Cabinet on 15 August 1877 that it 
would be possible for a British army to be landed at Batoum~ 
march Itwithout difficulty" through Armenia and threaten the 
ASiatic possessions of Russia severely enough to force her 
to a settlement. 3 Plans such as these illustrate very 
1. Be~consfield to Victoria~ 22 Ju& 1877, M & S, vi, p.155. 
2. 11 Jun 1877, Hansard, cited by CeCil, ii, p.155. 
3. Note in Cabinet, 15 Aug 1877, M & B, vi, p.172. See also 
letter to terby, 1 Sep 1877, ibid, pp ... 177-8, "an English 
army', 40,000 men with the BlaC"kSea and Batoum at our 
command, could march to Tiflis_" 
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clearly how a lack of geographical knowledge and a rather 
extravagant imagination could lead Beaconsfield into serious 
errors. On the other hand, they also illustrate Beaconsfield's 
conception of British policy in the Near East as part of a 
great imperial defence of the Indian Empire from a Russian 
menace which he believed had been growing for thirty years. 
At the end of July 1877 the successful Russian advance 
was checked at the City of Plevna, a great centre of roads 
on the right flank of their advance. The city did not fall 
until 9 December 1877 and, although the RUSSian advance in 
Asia was continuing, the immediate threat to Constantinople 
faded. Beaconsfield, encouraged by this show of strength by 
Turkey, was optimistic that Russia would be unable to achieve 
her aims before winter put an end to effective campaigning. 
/ It now seemed possible that hostilities might be halted 
before British interests were threatened. At a Cabinet 
meeting held on 15 August 1877 to discuss the Eastern Question, 
Beaconsfield suggested that Britain should be ready to take 
steps to prevent a second campaign by Russia. 1 At this point, 
Colonel Frederick Wellesley, the British military attach~ 
in Russia arrived in England. He brought personal assurances 
from the Tsar that Russia would only attack Constantinople 
if events forced her to do so and that British interests in 
1. Note on Cabinet, 15 Aug 1877, M & B, vi, pp.171-2. 
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Constantinople, Egypt, the Suez Canal and India would be 
respected. Beaconsfield seized the opportunity to convey 
a personal statement of his own Eastern policy to the Tsar. 
The content of the memorandum Wellesley took back to 
Russia was plainly threatening. It was designed to convince 
Russia that Beac.onsfield, while desirous of peace, was equally 
determined "to uphold the honour and defend the interests of 
1 England. II A second c.ampaign by Rus::;ia would involve Bri tain 
as a belligerent, stated Beaconsfield.. He then denied that 
this policy was not wholeheartedly supported by the Cabinet. 
This was quite untrue. Beaconsfield was going behind Derby's 
back in sending the memorandum, and Derby as well as Salisbury, 
Carnavon and Northcote would certainly have disapproved of 
its content. Beaconsfield doubtless considered that if the 
memorandum was to have the desired effect as a deterrent, 
Russia must he left in no doubt of British solidarity. 
Actually, it appears to have been a miscalculation on Beacons-
field's part. Instead of deterring the Tsar from any further 
advances, it made him determined to push hostilities forward 
so that Russia would not need a second c~paign. 
Turkey's display of unexpected vitality at Plevna also 
encouraged Beaconsfield to hope Turkey might yet be maintained 
as a European power.2 He had never wavered in his belief 
1.. Memorandum by Col. Wellesley, 17 Aug 1877, M & Bt , vi, pp. 
174-5. 
2. Beaconsfield to Lady Chesterfield, 8 Sep 1877, Zetland, ii, 
p.134. 
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that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire provided the 
best assurance of peace for Europe and the best security 
for the Indian Empire. 'rhe apparent weakness of Turkish 
government and the unpopularity of this traditional 
Palmerstonian outlook had made the policy impractical 
earlier in the year. From now on, while still recognising 
it as a possibility, Beaconsfield was opposed to the "dark 
game of partition. IIl 
On 5 October 1877, Beaconsfield proposed to the Cabinet 
that Britain offer to mediate between Turkey and Russia~ 
making it clear to Russia Britain was prepared to ally with 
the Porte should Constantinople be threatened. The Cabinet 
was "indisposed" to mix the offer of mediation wi th anything 
like a threat but they did favour the idea of obtaining a 
secret agreement from Russia at the close of the campaign 
that she 'A'ould not occupy Constantinople. At the same time, 
Britain would offer her services as a mediator. 2 By the 
beginning of November, Beaconsfield was becoming convinced 
that a Note demanding a secret but written agreement should 
be concluded immediately. Although the Turks still held 
Plevna, Russia was advancing rapidly in Asia ~linor and the 
situation was becoming more threatening to the imperial 
interests of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. If Russia 
I. Beaconsfield to Derby, 13 Sep '877, M & B, vi, p.178. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 5 Oct 1877, ibid, p.183. 
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sho~ld refuse the agreement, Beaconsfield contemplated war. 
He warned the Queen that she must prepare to use "all the 
means in your Haj esty I s Power ••• to guard your Haj esty IS 
Empire from such a resul til, that is, from the occupation 
of either Constantinople or the Dardanelles by the Ruscians. 1 
As yet, Beaconsfield dared not broach the subject of war to 
the Cabinet for he knew that while Turkey held Plevna, the 
Cabinet would not agree that the threat to Constantinople and 
the straits was i~nediate enough to warrant military action 
by Britain. 
Although the Cabinet agreed to send the Note, it was 
decided not to send it at once. RUmours had reached 
Britain of pas~ible Russian peace terms regarding Bulgaria, 
which were "ambiguous and dangerous l '. It was felt that, as 
the Bri tish Note referr'ed only to Constantinople and the 
Dardanelles, Hussia might take it to mean that British approval 
of the settlement proposed for Bulgaria \'Jould be forthcoming. 
It was agreed to delay sending the Note until circumstances 
should req~ire it. 2 Beaconsfield was quite agreeable to this. 
Bri tain had defined her interests in. Derby I s Note of 6 May 1877 
and these were the only British interests Beaconsfield was 
prepared to go to war for. On the other hand, the situation 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 16 Nov 1877, M & B, vi, p.J98. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 14 Nov 1877, Letters, ii, p.574. 
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in Bulgaria clearly affected the security of Constantinople 
and therefore Britain must attempt to secure a favourable 
settlement there. 
By 4 December 1877 Beaconsfield was again pressing 
Derby to send the Note at once and to word it as strongly 
as possible. He was afraid that RUBsia would be encouraged 
to continue the war if Britain continued to hold back. 
Beaconsfield was more convinced than ever that Russia was 
1 
ready for peace and that decisive action by Britain could 
lead to a peaceful settlement safeguarding British interests. 
On 9 December 1877 Plevna fell and the way to Constan-
tinople, lithe key to India", was open to the Russians. 
Beaconsfield was determined Britain must act at once to 
secure her i~terests. At a Cabinet meeting called on 14 
December he proposed that Parliament should be summoned 
immediately to vote a considerable increase in Britain's 
armed forces and that Britain should immediately commence 
negotiations as a mediator between the belligerents. When 
Salisbury, Carnavon and, of course, Derby, proved reluctant 
to agree, he forced their acquiescence by threatening to 
resign. The date for the meeting of Parliament was set at 
17 January 1878 and Beaconsfield looked forward expectantly 
to a vote of Credit which would permit "an army of oc&upation" 
1._ Beaconsfield to Derby, 5 Dec 1877. M & B, vi, p.1 99. 
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The situation continued to grow more critical through 
December. Turkey proved glad to accept British mediation 
but the victorious Russians refused to limit the right of 
action of their tr09Ps until an armistice had been coa-
eluded. To make matters worse, Beaconsfield still faced 
dissension within his Cabinet. Derby was actually leaking 
2 information of Cabinet proceedings to Shuvalov and 
Salisbury and Carnavon remained adamantly opposed to any 
steps which might lead to war with Russia. As Beaconsfield 
still hoped that a firm front by Britain might deter Russia 
from threatening British interests, this disagreement, 
faithfully reported to Shuvalov by Derby, was especially 
distressing .. 3 Divisions within the Cabinet continued to 
trouble him until March 1878. 
However, Beaconsfield was now resolute that Britain 
must make a stand. The threat to Constantinople and the 
Straits appeared too real to him to permit any further 
procrastination. Tbe Quee~ls speech on the opening of 
Parliament on 17 January 1878 contained a clear warning to 
Russia that al though the condi tions on which Bri tish 
neutrality was based had not yet been infringed, if hostil-
----------------------------------------------------------------
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 29 Dec. 1377, Letters, ii, p-582. 
2. Seton-Wat8o~, p.250j Blake, pp.627-8, 634-8. 
3. For instance, Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 25 Dec 1877, 
M & B, vi, p.210. 
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ities continued, it might be necessary to adopt measures 
f . 1 o precautlon. Speaking in the debate On the Address, 
Beaconsfield appealed to the House of Commons to be liberal 
in proViding the means lito vindicate the honour of the realm 
and to preserve ~d maintain the interests of the Empire. ,,2 
At the same time, Beaconsfield again approached Austria 
with the suggestion that they draw up an identical Note 
which would amount to a declaration that the RUssian seizure 
of either Constantinople or the Straits constituted a c.asus 
belli to both countries. Even at this stage, he appears to 
have been uncertain as to whether there was a secret Austrian-
Russian agreement. 3 Austria was indeed becoming alarmed at 
the extent of Russian progress, but as yet Andrassy preferred 
not to ally himself definitely with the British. 
But with or without allies, Beaconsfield was determined 
that Britain must act. On 23 January 1878 he persuaded the 
Cabinet to send the Fleet up to Constantinople, even though 
he knew the decision would result in the resignation of 
Derby and Carnavon4 On 24 January, Layard telegraphed that 
Turkey and RUssia had agreed on the bases of peace and the 
last of them made the question of control of the Straits a 
matter to be settled between lithe Congress and the Emperor 
1. M & B, vi, p.2l4. 
2. Ibid. 
3. HeaConsfield to Victoria, 19 Jan 1B7~, Letters, ii, p.5964 
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of Russia." This appeared to remove the justification for 
sending the Fleet and it was withdrawn. Derby returned to 
the Cabinet. Unfortunately, Layard was mistaken and the 
Tsar had, in fact, stated agreement over the Straits was to 
be between the Sultan and himself. Well aware British policy 
was already indecisive in appearance to the other powers, 
the Cabinet felt it would cost too much in dignity to send 
the Fleet back into the Straits. Nevertheless, Beaconsfield 
was aware the threat to Constantinople had not abated. 
It cannot be over-emphasised that even now Beaconsfield 
was not proposing to go to war with Russia in support of 
Turkey. If force was to be used by Britain, it would be 
used to defend interests that were peculiarly British; inter-
ests essential to the security of the Empire. Contemporaries 
had criticized Beaconsfield's policy as selfish: he pre-
ferred to describe it as patriotiC.' With realism that 
often bordered on cynicism, Beaconsfield saw altruism as 
something completely out of context in international politics. 
International politics were deCided by the use of power and 
the object of every nation's foreign policy must be to con-
serve the keystones of its own strength. For Britain, 
Turkish Constantinople was such a key. The Fleet did not 
enter the Strai ts as a sign of support for Turkey. "The 
1. Speech at GUildhall, 9 Nov 1877, M & B, . vi, pp.192-3. 
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intention of sending the fleet in that directtion was that it 
should defend the lives an~ properties of British subjects 
in Constantinople and take care of British interests in 
, 
the S trai ts. ,. To Beaconsfield, fir 1 tain I s main interest in 
the Straits was to prevent Russia gaining an outlet into the 
Mediterranean and thus putting Russia in a position where 
she would conceivable threaten British communications 
through the Mediterranean to Suez. 
Following protests by both Austria and Britain, Gort-
chakoff promised in a circular on 25 January that those 
aspects of the peace settlement which were of European 
interest should be decided only with the agreement of the 
great powers. Also, on 27 January 1878, Russia had concluded 
an armistice with Turkey. Despite this, rumours continued 
to reach Beaconsfield that the Russian troops were preparing 
to occupy the Turkish capital. 2.: As a result, Beaconsfield 
despatched the Fleet through the Dardanelles to the sea of 
Marmara and hurried along the preparations for a mili tary 
expedition should it be needed. In actual fact, these 
actions only served to convince Russia that Britain had 
determined on war and the Tsar prepared to enter Constanti-
nople. Fortunately, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in charge of 
1. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 7 Feb 1878, Zetland, ii, 
p •. 159. 
2. Sumner, pp.374-5. 
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the Russian army hesitated to give the necessary orders and 
war waG averted. For the 6econd and third weeke of February 
1878. however, RUBsia and Britain were hanging on the very 
brink of war and it was some tan weeks before tha danger of 
hostilities commencing passed. 
Sure that his actions had been the correct ones, Beacons-
field was not unhappy with the situation. In particular, he 
felt opinion in Britain was sWinging rapidly against the 
Russians and in favour of his imperial policy. The Cabinet, 
with the exception of Derby, exhibited a growing solidarity 
and Beaconsfield wrote hopefully to the Queen: lithe country 
is stirring at last; if we only had a corps d'armee at 
Gallipoli, the Crowns of Great Britain and India would not be 
1 
unworthy of the imperial brow which they adorn. I' His optimism 
at this time was probably due to his belief that Austria was 
now prepared to lend considerable aid should war be declared. 2 
In February 1878, Beaconsfield's mind was filled with 
schemes to ensure that Britain would be able to provide 
adequate protection for the route to the East. He entertained 
the at trac ti va idea of Ita league of the Medi t teranean Power's 
to secure the independence of that seall3 but the scheme was 
nullified at the outset by Derby's refusal to join such a 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 9 Feb 1878, M & B, vi. p.244. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 16 Feb 1878, ibid, p.248. 
3. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 2 Mar 1878, ibid, p.254. 
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league. Beaconsfield was also considering the acquisition 
of a base in the eastern Mediterranean. It was an idea he 
had been entertaining since before the Conference of Constan~ 
tinople 1 and hoe was sure the acq uisi tiOIl of "some terri torial 
station. conduci ve to 3ri tish interests,,2 would improve the 
security of the Empire. A position such as Mytilene, St. 
Jean d'Arc or a post in the Persian Gulf would give Britain 
lIa strong chain of communication with India" and lessen the 
chances of the Russian conditions of peace e~dangering that 
connection., Beaconsfield told the Cabinet. 3 The matter was 
referred to a committee and later re-emerged with the acquis-
ition of Cyprus. There was no question of it being abandoned, 
for the settlement between Russia and Turkey fulfilled all 
Beaconsfield's worst expectations. 
Although it was signed on 3 March, the details of the 
Treaty of San Stefan~ were not known by the British government 
until 23 March 1878. When the news did come, it was bad. The 
two conditions which most concerned the British were the 
creation of a huge Bulgaria stretching from the shores of the 
Black Sea to the Aegean and the cession to RUssia of all the 
eastern portion. of Armenia and the binding of Turkey to pay 
an indemnity of forty-five million pounds. Beaconsfield was 
1. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 29 Nov 1876, M & B, Vi, p.l03. 
2. Beaconsfield to Layard, 22 Nov 1877, ibid, p.251. 
3.. Northcote to Victoria, 2 Har 1878, ibid, p.253. 
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certain the new Bulgaria would be completely under Russian 
domination and afford her both a foothold on the Mediterranean 
and an ideal positio~ from which to threaten Constantinople. 
The cession of territory in Asia and the indemnity would mean 
the rem.a.in:der of Turkey would be "reduced to a state of 
absolute subjugation to Russia" which would mean RUssia having 
control, indirectly but effectively. of the outlet of the 
Black Sea. 1 Early in January, when it was understood that 
Russia and Turkey were negotiating, Britain had demanded that 
anything affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 187,2 must be 
approved by a conference of all the powers taking part in 
those Treaties. Andrassy then proposed the conference be 
held i~ Vienna and magnified into a congress of the powers. 
From the time he learnt the details of San Stefano, Beaconsfield 
considered it imperative that the Congress be allowed to 
review any articles of the settlement they felt necessary. 
This the Russians refused to agree to and on'ce again it seemed 
the two nations were on the verge of drifting into war. 
Beaconsfield, however, felt that war could be aVOided. 
He was sure Russia did not wish to fight and would relent if 
she was convinced that Britain was ready to go to war. 3 tlWe 
1._ Speech in House of Lords, 8 Apr 1878, Kebbel, 11, p.180. 
2. Treaty of Paris 1856 and Treaty of London 1871. 
3. Notes by Derby at the Cabinet, 27 Mar 1878, M & B, vi, 
p.264 .. 
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have to maintain the Empire and secure peace; I think we 
can do both", he wrote to Hardy. But if Britain was to 
avoid drifting into ~lJar she must be "bold and determined. ,,1 
On 27 March 1873, after reminding the Cabinet that the 
peaceful maintenance of the Empire was still the object of 
British foreign policy, he proposed calling out the reserves 
in England and sending an expedition from India to occupy 
Cyprus and Scanderoon. The Cabinet, wi th the exc e;,>tion 
of Derby, agreed to both proposals. Derby resigned ,and 
Salisbury took his place as Foreign Secretary. Beaconsfield's 
policy at this stage VIas a determined one but, more important, 
it was a colourful and impressive one. Beaconsfield had 
always wanted Britain to act forcefully in the manner of a 
great imperial power. At last she was dOing so and he was 
sure the other powers of Europe would be impressed by 
Britain's show of strength. The use of Indian troops, in 
particular, would emphasise the extra-European basis of 
Bri tish power. liThe imagination of the C'ontinent will be 
much affected by the first appearance of what they will believe 
2 to be an inexhaustible supply of men. II This was the value 
of the Indian expedition to l1alta. Only 7,000 troops arrived 
and if war had been declared, they could not have provided a 
significant obstacle to the massed i{ussian forces which were 
1. Beaconsfield to Hardy, 27 Har 1878, H & B, vi, p.261. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 12 Apr 1878, ibid~ p.285. 
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accepted in London as totalling around 120,000 combatants, 
1 
south of the Balkans. ttlt will show Russia we are in 
earnest" Beaconsfield \'Jrote to Lady Bradford2 and it would 
also hint that Britain possessed tremendous resources to 
fight a vrar in defence of her interests. 
The Russians were suitably impressed by Beaconsfield's 
actions. They appeared to provide tangible evidence for the 
contention of the mocerates in the Russian Foreign Office 
that the Treaty of San Stefano had left Russia in a danger-
ously over-extended position which must either lead to war or 
a humiliating withdrawal. From now until the 'rreaty of 
Berlin in July 1878, the moderates as represented hy Shuvalov 
and Gortchakoff, regained the decisive influence over ]ussian 
policy and Ignatyev, spokesman of the aggressive Panslavists, 
disappeared from the scene. At the same time, Salisbury 
both more able and more energetic than Derby, and with a 
realistic appreciation of the problems of imperial relation-
ships, brought direction and a positive outlook to British 
diplomacy. From now on, the threat of war abated steadily. 
After initiating further unproductive advances to Andrassy, 
Salisbury began direct negotiations with the Russians. Progress 
was steady and on 30 May 1878 an agreement was Signed. The 
1. Home to Tenterden, 10 April 1878, cited in footnote, Sumner, 
p·.39? 
2. Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 16 April 1878, Zetland, ii, 
p.183~ 
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crucial point of the Anglo-Hussian Convention, as the agree-
ment was termed, was Russia's surrender of the big Bulgaria 
of San Stefano for a smaller state divided into two pro-
vinces separated by the Balkans. Only the northern provinces 
were to be autonomous. The southern was to have self-govern-
ment under the Turks. This would make the Balkan range the 
frontier of the effective Turkish Empire. 
Beaconsfield was satisfied that the agreement would pro-
Vide adequate security for Constantinople and the Straits.' 
However, he feared the Russian conquests in Armenia endangered 
the route to the Indian Empire from another direction. 
Beaconsfield could see nothing to prevent the Russians 
menacing the Suez Canal by marching through Asia Minor from 
Armen1a. 2 It was equally possible for them to penetrate 
south-east towards the Persian Gulf. The Tsar was not prepared 
to give up the territory annexed in Asia and the Convention 
contained only minor conc essions in this respec t. '1'0 meet 
this new threat, Beaconsfield reverted to the idea of Britain 
obtaining from Turkey a stronghold from which she could safe-
guard her interests in western Asia. His choice was the island 
of Cyprus, Its strategic value has since been severely 
criticized but it was recommended by Colonel Home, one of the 
,. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 21 Apr 1878, M & B, vi, p.289. 
2. Speech in the House of Lords, 8 Apr 1878, Kebbel, ii, 
pp.173-4 .. 
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officers sent to Constantinople to examine defences and 
Beaconsfield was convinced it was "the key to western Asia." 
In return for Cyprus, Bri tain would enter into; a defensive 
alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing her Asian territories 
from Russian invasion. Beaconsfield assured the Queen that 
by such an arrangement, "your Majesty IS Indian Empire ll would 
be "immensely strengthened. II It would tlweld together your 
Majesty's Indian Empire and Great Britain. 1l1 A simple 
agreement to this effect was signed with Turkey on 4 June 1878. 
It is important to see both these agreements as part 
of the same policy. Beaconsfield was not prepared to concede 
the Tsar extensive gains of territory in Asia unless the 
security of the route to India was safeguarded by Turkey's 
2 
cession. of Cyprus. It was not until 26 May 1878 that the 
Sultan agreed to the proposal and only then could Salisbury 
bring the negotiations with Shuvalov to a satisfactory con-
elusion. Only when taken together were the two agreements 
an adequate security for the Empire. 
As a result of these negotiations, Beaconsfield and 
Salisbury departed for Berlin and the Congress, confident 
British interests were already assured. So far as Britain 
was concerned, the work of the Congress was largely a matter 
of the registration of a settlement already concluded in the 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 5 May 1878, M & B, vi, p.291 • 
2. The Shuvalov Memorandum, ibid, p.297. 
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Anglo-Russian Convention. Nonetheless, there is no doubt 
this was the high point of Beaconsfield's career. Although 
the real loser by the Treaty of Berlin was Turkey, the settle-
ment with regard to Bulgaria cannot be see~ as other than a 
victory for Britain and a defeat for Russia. Beaconsfield 
returned in triumph bringing, he claimed, "peace with honour." 
On 18 July 1878 he justified the policy he had pursued over 
the last few months to the House of Lords. His main con-
tention was that by the Congress and the Cyprus Convention, 
the menace to European independence and the threatened injury 
to the British Empire had been averted. In Europe, although 
the frontiers of Turkey had been shortened, the Ottoman 
Empire remained as a check to Russia and an assurance the 
balance of power would be maintained. But while the settle-
ment was advantageous to Europe as a whole, Beaconsfield 
emphasised that Britain possessed interests in the East more 
conSiderable than the other powers and peculiar to Britain. 
Britain' 6 interests were "urgent and substantial and enormous. I' 
They involved the security of the Indian Empire. It was 
because Russian expansion in Asia Minor posed a threat to 
this security that Britain had signed the Cyprus Convention. 
The Eastern Question had always made India "a source of 
grave anxietytl to Britain, Beaconsfield said, and British 
policy had been directed. at removing this anxiety. tlIn taking 
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Cyprus the movement is not Meditteranean. it is Indian. 1I It 
was an essential step towards lithe maintenance of our Empire 
and its preservation in peace." The possession of Cyprus 
and the alliance wi th 'furkey gave Britain "that fore e which 
it is necessary to possess often in great transactions, 
though you may not fortunately feel that it is necessary to 
have recourse to that force." In sOme ways, Beaconsfield 
conceded, his policy might have added to the responsibilities 
of Britain, 'but it was designed to ensure that Bri tain would 
never assume the "responsibility of handing to our successors 
a weakened or diminished Empire ll • 1 
* * 
.. .. • .. • 
Obviously many very serious criticisms can be made of 
Beaconsfield's policy in the Near East, 1876-1878. The 
basic premises of that policy were dubiOus in the extreme~ 
for it relied upon the assumption that Russian policy in 
the Near East posed a threat to the security of the Indian 
Empire by threatening Britain's route to India through the 
Mediterranean. In fact, there i6 no evidence of Russia ever 
contemplating placing pressure in this direction. Even if she 
1. Speech to the Lords, 18 Jul 1878, Kebbel, ii, pp.180-201. 
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had, it is still extremely strange that Beaconsfield should 
have been obses8ed with the notion that Constantinople and 
control of the Straits was the key to the whole problem. 
Russia, who did not even possess a fleet on the Black Sea, 
was highly unlikely to have ever been able to challenge 
British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. It was, more-
over, just as unlikely that she would attempt to march an 
expedition more than 1,000 miles largely through desert to 
Egypt and the Suez. In this context, Beaconsfield's alarm 
at the possible consequences of the Russian advance into 
Armenia appears much more reasonable than his older concern 
for the safety of Constantinople. 
But Beaconsfield had assumed office with the long-
standing conviction that Russian expansion constituted a 
deliberate and growing threat to Britain's Indian Empire 
which Britain must counter. He certainly believed Constan-
tinople was the "key to India l '. On the other hand, he did 
not believe that Balkan nationalism and Panslavism owed their 
inspiration to anything other than RUSSia's imperialistic 
ambitions. Consequently, it was easy for Beaconsfield to 
construe the development of the Eastern Question, culminating 
in war between Russia and Turkey, as justification of his 
longstanding suspicions of Russia. 
It was, therefore, vital, he believed, for Britain to 
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take immediate action to safeguard her interests. Unfortunately 
for the Prime Minister, opinion within Britain as a whole, and 
within his Cabinet in particular, made it impossible for him 
to implement the forthright policy he advocated. As a result, 
for the two years following the re-opening of the Eastern 
Question, British policy appeared vacillating and indecisive. 
Ironically, this was precisely the appearance Beaconsfield 
was sure Britain must avoid if she was to both avoid war and 
secure her Empire. Despite this, there is nothing to suggest 
that 3eaconsfield's own aims in the Eastern Question altered 
substantially during these two years. He was consistent as 
to ends even if he remained flexible as to means of achieving 
those ends. Circumstances forced him to explore all the 
avenues which might keep the routes to India safe, even an 
alliance with Russia herself. Not until 1878, however, was 
Beaconsfield able to adopt the policy he had always considered 
both appropriate to Britain's status as a great imperial 
power and most likely to bring a peaceful and satisfactory 
settlement. Events in the first half of that year appeared 
to justify his contention that once Russia was convinced 
Britain was determined to fight rather than give way, she 
herself would back down. 
Beaconsfield returned from the Congress of Berlin con-
fident the security of the Empire was at last secured. It 
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appeared his policy had been completely suc,cessful and the 
threat to British communications with her Indian Empire 
that Beaconsfield had seen developing since 1871 had been 
met. In this hour of triumph it certainly did not: occur to 
Beaconsfield to wonder whether in actual fact the threat had 
ever really existed. 
~8aloum 
.... 
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CHAPTER v~ AFG II AN I S;.rAN • 
The close of the first session of Parliament in 1878 
saw the Earl of Beaconsfield at the height of his reknown 
and popularity. To Beaconsfield himself, virtually all 
his objectives in foreign policy appeared to have been 
achieved. The threat to the security of the Indian Empire 
that he had seen stemming from the ~~ussian advance into 
the Near East had been succesGfully met with the Treaty of 
Berlin and the Cyprus Convention. The leading role Britain 
assumed in the settlement of the Eastern Question and her 
success at the Congress of Berlin had raised British in-
fluence and prestige in Europe to heights she had not enjoyed 
since the death of Palmerston. Moreover, the shadowy Drei-
kaiserbund which had threatened to dominate Europe during 
the first two years of Beaconsfield's ministry had disin-
tegrated. Austria had associated herself with British policy 
at Berlin and Bismarck, impressed by the personality of 
Beaconsfield and disliking the ~~ussian Chancellor, Gortchakoff I 
had also shown considerable sympathy for the British view-
pOint. 
Unfortunately, the glory Beaconsfield brought back from 
Berlin was not to last until the end of the ministry in 1830. 
Even in 1873 a deepening agricultural and industrial depression 
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at home detracted from the glamour and success of the 
government abroad. In the next two years, two wars, one 
in Afghanistan and the other in South Africa, were to cast 
a blight on the reputatio~ of Conservative foreign policy. 
Both were easily represented by the Opposition as being the 
result of an over-ambitious imperial policy. Added to the 
growing social and economic distres8 of the country, they 
contributed decisively to the steady deterioration of Conserv-
ati~e popularity which ended in a heavy electoral defeat in 
1880. 
But in June 1878 all this lay in the future, and Beacons-
field, for the moment at least, was content to rest upon his 
laurels. The exertions of the Berlin Congress had placed an 
almost intolerable strain upon his failing health and he 
returned to England completely eXhausted. From this time on t 
he was content to entrust more and more of the conduct of 
British diplomacy to Salisbury who had won Beaconsfield's 
confidence completely by the time the two had returned to 
England from Berlin. The foreign policies of the two men had 
been moving closer together since the beginning of 1878 and 
it seems that Salisbury had by now beCome infected with 
Beaconsfield's enthUsiasm for a foreign policy based upon 
1 the maintenance of Britain's imperial character. 
1. Speech at Conservative banquet in Knightsbridge, 27 Jul t878, 
CeCil, ii, p.301~ 
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However, jf Beaconsfield was content to .leave the day to 
day conduct of the Foreign Office to Salisbury, he still 
retained the final initiative in directing the broad out-
lines of British diplomacy. From the time the Eastern 
Question re-opened, early in 1876~ until the middle of 1878 
Beaconsfield's attention had been concentrated almost entirely 
upon events in the Near East. With the Treaty of Berlin 
signed, his foreign policy took on a rather wider perspective 
and his attention was directed first of all to the balance of 
power in Europe. Beaconsfield had always believed it to be 
essential that Britain play a dominant role in European 
affairs. His speech at Guildhall to the Lord l-Iayor I s Banquet, 
1879~ illustrated this very clearly. 
If there be a country, for example, one of the 
most extensive and wealthiest empires in the 
world - if that country, from a perverse inter-
pretation of its insular geographical position, 
turns an indifferent ear to the feelings and the 
fortunes of Continental Europe, such a course 
would, I believe, only end in its becoming an 
object of general plunder. So long as the 
power and advice of England are felt in the 
councils of Europe, peace, I believe, will be 
maintained, and for a long period. Without their 
presence war •.• seems to me inevitable. 
Englishmen must not be ashamed of their Empire he continued. 
It provided the best assurance of their continuing freedom, 
and "Imperium et Libertas" was a policy IIfrom which her 
Majesty's advisers do not shrink. 111 
1. (10)1 Nov 1878, M & B, vi, pp.494-5. 
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The speech reiterated Beaconsfield's belief that Britain 
must use the power afforded by her imperial stature to safe-
guard her interests in Europe as well as elsewhere. The 
Bource of Britain's strength lay basically in her overseas 
possessions but this did not mean European affairs were of no 
concern to her. If Britain did not make her influence felt 
on the continent she was liable to find herself isolated 
and vulnerable in the face of hostile power groupings which 
might threaten not only her position in Europe, but the 
security of her Empire as well. This was the danger Beacons-
field had seen threatening at the beginning of his ministry 
with the forming of the Dreikaiserbund. In his eyes, the 
maintenance of ~ritain's power and prestige depended upon her 
intelligent use of that same power and prestige to safeguard 
her own interests. 
Beaconsfield had developed this realistic and highly 
perceptive understanding of power politics well before 1874. 1 
It supplies the reason for his attempts to reassert British 
influence in Europe and break up the shadowy alliance between 
RUBsia, uermany and Austria in the first two years of his 
ministry. The necessity he saw to curb Russian activities 
in the Near East in order to secure the indian Empire, had 
then diverted his attention to the Near East. tlowever, the 
1. ~ee Chapter 1. 
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other European powers were also involved, for one reason 
or another, in the Eastern crisis and it was very much a 
European matter. It was Britain's final success in the 
settlement of the Eastern Question that had made her ascend-
ent Over Russia in Europe. Now attention returned to the 
continent itself. Professor Medlicott regards the years 
1878-80 as marking a struggle, nonetheless real for being 
largely concealed, between Beaconsfield and Bismarck for 
, 
the leadership of Europe. It is certainly true that Beacons-
field's reactions to events outside of Europe were partly 
determined by the effect he felt they would have upon the 
situation in Europe. 
Yet, despite his preoccupation with events in Europe, 
the cornerstone of Beaconsfield's foreign policy remained 
the maintenance of the Bri tish. Empire. It was only this 
Empire which afforded Britain the power to intervene success-
fully in Europe.. However, imperial affairs appeared to be in 
a very satisfactory state immediately following the Signing 
of the Berlin agreement, and it was for thiG reason that 
Beaconsfield felt he could turn his attention elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, the scene did not remain tranquil for long. 
In the first place, it was soon apparent that the Treaty 
1. Essay by W:N.Medlicott in A.O.Sarkissian, (ad), Studies 
in History and Historiography, pp.242-50 •. 
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of Berlin had not brought an immediate end to the Eastern 
Question,- for a number of problems concerning the implemen-
tation of the agreement soon appeared. The most critical 
from Beaconsfield's viewpoint was securing the evacuation 
of Russian troops from Turkish territory south of the Balkans. 
So long as they remained. Constantinople could not be secure. 
The final evacuation of Russian troops did not come until 
August 1879 and it was the outcome of almost constant 
diplomatic haggling from the time the Treaty was signed. On 
several occasions, it seemed not unlikely that hostilities 
might break out again between Russia and Turkey and the 
ticklish negotiations involved were a constant source of worry. 
It was not the Near East, however, which was to provide 
Beaconsfield's main problem in the last two years of his 
ministry, but the remote country of Afghanistan. Beaconsfield 
had always viewed RU8sian expansion in Central Asia as part 
of the Hussian menace to the security of the Inoian Empire. 
He was well aware that it was through Afghanistan that north-
ern conquerors had invaded India in the past. Consequently 
Afghanistan occupied an important place in Beaconsfield's 
plans for the defence of the Indian Empire. If Britain had 
gone to war with ~ussia over the Eastern Question, an import-
ant part of British strategy involved the invasion of Asiatic 
Russia by a British army marching through Afghanistan. 1 Such 
1. Lytton to Salisbury, 28 Oct, 30 Nov 1876, 21 Nay 1877, 13 Jul 
1878, Blake p.659. Also Beaconsfield to Victoria, 22 Jul 1877. 
M & B, vi, p.155. 
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a scheme was really quite ridiculous. The terrain of 
Afghanistan_ was mountainous and inhospitable; the people 
primitive and hostile. Even if a British expedition did 
cross Afghanistan into Turkestan a force of, for example, 
1 40,.000 men would have been completely lost in.. the vast 
areas of hostile territory which awaited them. Nonetheless, 
Beaconsfield did see such an expedition as possible and must, 
therefore, have believed it equally plausible that Russia 
could threaten India by marching in the opposite direction. 
In view of Russian expansion into 'rurkestan and Bokhara in 
the late 1860's and early 1870's, Afghanistan thus appeared 
of increasing significance to Beaconsfield as a buffer against 
possible Russian designs on India. Britain's diplomatic 
relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, could not 
be left to the old policy of "masterly inactivity", or simply 
leaving events beyond the north-west frontier to work them-
selves out. 
It was with this desire for more positive action towards 
Afghanistan in mind that lleaconsfield selected Lytton to 
replace Northbrook when the latter resigned towards the end 
of 1875. Beaconsfield wanted "a man of ambition, imagination, 
d 11 1 t . al 2 some vanity an much wi II to ho d he Vlceroy ty. With 
1. The size of General Robert's column. which marched on 
Cahul in the second Afghan War. 
2. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 1 Apr 1877, M & B, vi, p.379. 
-118-
Russia now on the borders of Afghanistan, he felt the 
situation demanded a man. capable of taking positive action 
to defend the Indian Empire from the dangers which threatened 
it. Lytton's final instructions from Beaconsfield emphasised 
the necessity of consolidating the frontier by inducing the 
Amir to enter into more satisfactory relations with the 
British government. If this was not pOSSible, the Amir was 
at least to be compelled to show clearly his attitude to 
Britain and Russia respectively. Something had to be done, 
Beaconsfield emphaSised, to end the uncertainty and suspicions 
which had hampered Anglo-Afghan relations up until this time. 1 
As a result of his instructions, Lytton arrived in India 
resolved to end the policy of "masterly inactivityll and make 
Afghanistan a reliable buffer between the two empires •. 
Unfortunately, Lytton proved to be a man of rather too much 
"ambition" and "vanity" even for Beaconsfield's taste. 
Determined to achieve personal greatness as Viceroy, he decided 
from the outset to establish his own paramount influence in 
Afghanistan with or without the Amixls co-operation. 
So long as the possibility of an Anglo-Russian war 
remain·ed even Lytton realized it was vital to maintain amicable 
relations with the Amir in case British troops should have to 
march across Afghanistan. However, once the Treaty of Berlin 
1. Lady Betty Balfour, Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 
pp.28-9 ... 
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had been signed, Lytton considered it was time to take steps 
to provide for the permanent security of the North-west 
frontier. Since the announcement of the Halta expedition, 
Russian activities in Central Asia had increased. In June 
1878 a Russi~ mission under General Stolietov was received 
at Kabul by the Amir. Although the Amir was virtually forced 
to receive the missio~ by pressure from Kauf~, the Russian 
Governor of Turkestan, Lytton preferred to regard the Amir's 
actions as conclusive proof of his bad faith. He was certain 
that Britain must now take action to safeguard the security 
of the Indian frontiers and at the beginning of August, he 
requested permission to send a British mission to Kabul as 
a counter to Stolietov's mission. 
Beaconsfield saw the situation in a different light. He 
viewed the situation in Afghanlstan as a part of the Eastern 
Question as a whole and in this respect, the Situation in 
August 1878 was vastly different from that at the beginning of 
1876. He believed Russian imperialist ambitions had received 
a major check with the signing of the Berlin agreements and 
that Russia had withdrawn at least temporarily, from her 
position of ag&ression. On 16 September 1878 Gortchakoff 
6ent his personal assurances to the British of the innocence 
of RUSSian intentions in Afghanistan1 and with peace now agreed 
1. Letter from Gortchakoff, 16 Sep 1878, M & B, vi, p.376. 
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to, Beac onsfi eld was confident the l.~ussians would wi thdraw 
their mission and the whole matter would quietly lapse. 1 
A direct confrontation between Russia and Britain in Afghan-
istan could well have jeopardized the working out of the 
Berlin settlement and Beaconsfield was understandably 
anxious to avoid such a clash. He had no intention of per-
mitting Rus:c,ia to gain a foothold in Afghanistan but 
believed the issue could be settled qUietly with a little 
patience. 
Unfortunately, Lytton felt he was now past the point 
of no return. His request for permission to send a mission to 
Kabul had been tentatively approved by Lord Cranbrook, 
Secretary of ~tate for India, on 3 August 1878, but Lytton 
was clearly instructed that the route taken by the mission 
must be through Candahar and not via the Khyber Pass. The 
Viceroy, however, was determined to take the second route and 
made preparations to do so throughout August with conSiderable 
publicity. In the meantime, the Foreign Office had decided to 
send a diplomatic protest concerning the presence of the 
Russian mission at Kabul to St. Petersburg and it went on 19 
August 1878. Cranbrook, who distinguished himself throughout 
the affair as both lazy and inattentive, neglected to inform 
Lytton of this despatch even though Beaconsfield and Salisbury 
1. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 20 Sep 1878, M & B, vi, p.3?6. 
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had decided the mission should not be sent until an answer 
1 had been received to the note~ 
Lytton's communications with the home government were 
also extremely fragmentary and his telegrams home during 
July and August were very sketchy indeed. At this stage, it 
does not appear that Beaconsfield and Salisbury appreciated 
the precise nature of the Viceroy I s plans... Full details of 
Lytton's instructions to the head of his mission. Sir Neville 
Chamberlain, did not arrive in London until 9 September 1873. 
Only then did Beaconsfield become aware of Lytton's intention 
to make Sher Ali's dismissal of General Stolietov's mission a 
prior condition of receiving his own~ Such an action was 
only defensible if a major confrontation with Russia was 
necessary. A cable was despatched to Lytton, ordering him to 
delay the mission until the Foreign Office had received an 
answer to their despatch. Only now, did Lytton learn that 
such a despatch had been sent. He delayed the mission from 
its SCheduled departing date, 16 September 1878, until 21 
September 1878 but then decided he could hang back no longer. 
He was confident Sher Ali would accept the mission and that 
the home government, at heart, wanted him to send it. On 
21 September 1878, he ordered Chamberlain to enter the Khyber. 
The mission was turned back at the frontier by Afghan soldiers, 
1.. For a full discussion of this and other aspects of the or1ginf 
of the Second Afghan War, see M.Cowling, "Lytton, the Cabinet 
and the Russians, August to November, 1878", En,yllish 
Historical Review, lxxvi (1961), pp~60-79. 
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a rebuff which made war inevitable if Britain was not to 
lose a tremendous amount of prestige in the East. 
Beaconsfield was annoyed by Lytton's headstrong actions 
and alarmed by their possible consequences~ but it does 
appear that he was irked a good deal more by Lytton's failure 
than by what the Viceroy had tried to accomplish. !'When 
V-Roys and Commanders-in-chief disobey orders they ought 
to be sure of success in their mutiny", he wrote to Cranbrook 
1 iwnediately after learning of Chamberlain's rebuff. In 
the days immediately preceding the despatch of the mission, 
Beaconsfield had informed Cranbrook that he agreed whole-
heartedly with Lytton's general policy.2 On 22 September 1878, 
still before news of the setback had arrived, he wrote to 
Cranbrook in even stronger terms. IIThere are times for ac tion" , 
he said after commenting that this was not a time for prudence. 
He continued: "I am clearly of the opinion that what we want, 
at this present moment, is to 9rove our ascendancy in Afghan-
istan, and, to accomplish that, we must not stick at trifles •.• n3 
There can, therefore, be no doubt Beaconsfield entirely agreed 
wi th the aims of Lyt ton.' s policy, but Lyt ton had based his 
methods on a false premise_ His approach to the problem 
assumed RUSsia to be a hostile power, and in September 1878 
1. Beaconsfield to Cranbrook, 26 Sep 1878, M & B, vi, p.382. 
2. Beaconsfield to Cranbrook, 13 and 17 Sep 1878, ibid, p.381. 
3. Beaconsfield to Cranbrook, 22 Sep 1878, ibid, p.382. 
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Beaconsfield did not agree. Russia had "sneaked out of her 
hostile posi tionll he wrote to Salisbury, and 1 f Lytton had 
only been prudent and obeyed orders, "Sher Ali would have 
1 been equally prudent. 1i Beaconsfield, too, believed that 
Afghanistan must be made a buffer against a possible RUssian 
advance in the future. However, if Lytton had awaited the 
reply to the British Note, Russia would have disavowed any 
notion that she would support Afghanistan against the Britishp 
and Sher Ali would have given way. Britain had now been 
forced to resort to arms and this might bring a clash with 
Hussia which could jeopardize the working out of the Berlin 
settlement and would certainly cause criticism of the govern-
ment's policy at home. 
Nevertheless, Beaconsfield realised "some demonstration 
of power and determination tl was necessary, but he wished it 
to be as moderate as possible. Britain should occupy the 
Kurran. Valley as a "material euarantee" without resorting to 
war, he proposed to the Cabinet on 4 October 1878.2 It was 
an idea highly reminiscent of his proposal to occupy the 
Dardanelles at the beginlung of the Russo-Turkish war. It was, 
of course, intended to achieve the objects Beaconsfield hoped 
his earlier proposal would have achieved and secure Britain's 
1. Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 3 Oct 1878, M & B, vi, p.383. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 26 Oct 1878, ibid, p.386. 
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interests while antagonizing Russia as little as possible. 
Beaconsfield still hoped Russia might refuse to have anything 
to do with the crisis. His hopes were justified and Russia 
did, in fact, qUietly withdraw from the scene_ 
With Russia off the scene, Beaconsfield decided to make 
the best of prevailing circumstances. He determined to effect 
the consolidation of the North-west frontier which he had long 
considered to be necessary for Indian security. Speaking at 
Guildhall in November 1878, he elaborated on this theme. The 
danger of an invasion of India through Asia Minor had, Beacons-
field claimed, been averted by the Cyprus Convention which 
gave Britain "a strong place of arms" from which to saf'eguard 
her interests, and secured the Sultan in possession of his 
Asiatic dOminions. But the Indian Empire could not be secure 
so long as the "haphazard" nature of the North-west frontier 
made it possible for "any foe ••• to embarrass and disturb our 
dominion. II However, "some peculiar circumstances have occurred 
in that part of the world", he continued and as a result,. the 
government had made "arrangements by which ••• all anxiety 
1 
respecting the north-western frontier of India will be removed,lI 
Part of these "arrangeme? ts" evidently involved war, for on 
21 November 1878, British troops entered the Amir's territory. 
It was not Beaconsfield's intention to either annex large 
1. Speech on Lord Mayor's Day, 10 November 1878, M & B, vi. 
PP.390-1. 
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areas of territory, nor to dismember Afghanistan. The "rec-
tification" of frontiers contemplated need not in fact demand 
any diminution. of Afghan ter.ci tory at all, he told the House 
of Lords on 11 December 1878. All Britain needed was permiss-
io~ to place a minister in residence at Kabul, to be able to 
send Consuls to the chief towns and to make some minor 
territorial adjustments to the North-west frontier to render 
it more easily defensible.' In other words, this war was 
being fought to secure the existing frontiers and provide 
an insurance against the possibility of Russian expansion 
threatening India in the future. It was most definitely not 
conceived of by Beaconsfield as a war to expand British 
frontiers. 
Beaconsfield went on to point out to the House the deeper 
significance he attached to events in Afghanistan. In his 
eyes, the influence and prestige of Britain in Europe were 
also at stake. lilt is not a question of the Khyber Pass merely, 
and of some small cantonments at Dakka or Jellabad. It is a 
question which concerns the character and inflUence of England 
in Europe." Obviously Beaconsfield believed that for Britain 
to accept a serious setback in Afghanistan would be to under-
mine the dominant position in Europe won at the Berlin Congress. 
As a consequence, the balance of power in Europe, which was at 
,. 3 Hansard, 243, Cols.509-14. 
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this stage tilted in favour of Britain, would be adversely 
affected. He reminde6. the House that in the past the "pr-in-
ciple of peace at any pric.e
" 
had disturbed and nearly destroyed 
"that political equilibrium so necessary to the liberties of 
nations ll and had dimmed for the moment "even the majesty of 
1 England." A successful action in Afghanistan, on the other 
hand, woulo add to British prestige and emphasise Britain's 
ability and determination to secure her imperial interests. 
The whole idea is obviously derived from Beaconsfield's 
belief in power as the basLs of diplomacy. It was important 
not only for Britain to realise her own strength and use it 
but also for other powers to be aware of it. 
Thanks largely to the brilliant operations of the colUmn 
commanded by General Roberts, the progress of Bri tish forces 
in Afghanistan was rapid. liThe check to Russia, to use a 
very mild expression, is complete ll , Beaconsfield wrote to the 
Queen on. 6 December 1878. He hoped the Queen was well on a 
bright mornin.g "which is as bright as yoW" Majesty's imperial 
fortunes.,,2 Sher Ali fled to Russian Turkestan and British 
negotiations for peace took place with his son, Yakub Khan~ 
After some months of negotiations the Treaty of Gandamak was 
signed on 26 May 1879, giving Britain almost complete control 
over Afghan foreign policy. BeaconSfield I s IIscientific 
1 ... Cited in. H & B, vi, pp.400-401. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 6 Dec 1878, ibid, PP.397-8. 
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frontier tl appeared to have been established with relative 
ease. Writing to the Queen on New Year's Day 1879. Beacons-
field spoke of the "brilliant and enduring success in ASia. tt1 
The war had added to the achievements of the Berlin Congress~ 
In fact, the Afghan issue was not to be settled so easily~ 
but for the time being, the crisis there appeared to be over. 
In any case, Beaconsfield's attention was now diverted 
to South Africa. On 22 January 1879, part of a British 
force invading Zululand under Lord Chelmsford was surprised 
by the enemy at Isandhlwana and eight. hundred regulars and 
nearly five hundred Bantu levies were slaughtered. Reinforce-
ments were despatched at once to South Africa but the Zulu 
forces under their King, Cetywayo, were not finally defeated 
until 4 July 1879. An evaluation of the government's policy 
in this crisis is not relevant to the defence of India. 
Suffice it to say that Beaconsfield is regarded by Blake as 
having rather lost his head over this new complication. 2 
What are significant here are the reasons why this new setback 
should have 80 upset Beaconsfield. 
Beaconsfield viewed the Zulu War as a disaster not 
because he felt British rule in South Africa was endangered 
but because he was sure such a spectacular defeat would reduce 
British influence in Europe and provide a drain upon British 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 1 Jan 1879, t1 & B, vi, p.405. 
2. Blake, p.665. 
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1 
military resources. This would weaken British power in 
Europe and endanger British chances of ensuring Russia 
fulfilled the conditions of the Berlin Treaty. Reviewing 
the situation in a letter to the Queen at the end of August 
1879, Beaconsfield claimed the war had done lIincalculablell 
damage to Britain. If it had not taken place. the Q.ueen 
would by this time have been "Dictatress of Europe" and the 
Sultan of Turkey would by now have occupied the line of the 
Balkans.2 It is extremely doubtful whether events in far off 
South Africa exerted as decisive an influence as this. Actually 
the main damage done by the war was the opportunity it gave 
the Opposition to use the incident as yet another example 
of Conservative bungling. Nonetheless, Beaconsfield's 
reasoning is illuminating. It illustrates very clearly that, 
for him. there were only two vital considerations in British 
foreign policy: the maintenance of British power in Europe, 
and the using of this power to check Russia in the East and 
thus secure the Empire. A crisis in Afghanistan was obviously 
relevant to the European situation in the same way as war 
in South Africa. The difference lay in the importance Beacons-
field attached to Afghanistan as an essential part of Indian 
security. Thus a war which established British dominance in 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 11 Feb 1879, M & B, vi, p.424. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria. 30 Aug 1879, ibid, p.45ge 
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Afghanistan vIas "a brilliant and enduring success". A war 
in South Africa J even although it finally added to the 
security of British rule there, was a disaster. 
With the Zulu War over, Beaconsfield was once again 
complncent over the condition of Britain's external affairs. 
On 74 August 1879 he wrote to Lytton congratulating him on 
his "energy and foresight" which had been instrumental in 
securing "a scientific and adequate frontier for our Indian 
Empire." Wi th ;-~ussia by now completely evacuated from 
furkish territory, Beaconsfield felt external affairs would 
"figure wel l in the Queen's speech."l 
Unhappily, Beaconsfield's jubilation was again premature, 
and his complacency Vias rudely shat tered by news of a fresh 
crisis in Afghanistan. The Treaty of Gandamak had given 
Britain the right to install in Kabul a British resident to 
advise Afghanistan on matters of foreign policy and to report 
to the Indian government on events there. The safety of the 
resident, Sir Louis Gavagnari, was guaranteed by the Amir, 
but on 6 September 1879 Cavagnari and the whole British mission 
at Kabul were attacked and killed by Afghan soldiers. As far 
as Beaconsfield was concerned, the treachery rendered the 
Treaty of Gandamak completely null and void and a new settle-
ment would have to be made. Immediate military action under 
1. Beaconsfield to Lytton, 14 Aug 1879, Balfour, p.331. 
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General Roberts quickly re-established British power in 
Afghanistan. By the middle of October 1879 the British 
government was in a position to consider how a lasting 
settlement could be aChieved. 
This fresh crisis did not alter Beaconsfield I s c.on-
ception of what British interests in Afghanistan really 
were. British influence in that country was, in his eyes, 
merely part of Indian security and to this end the best 
arrangement remained the maintenance of Afghanistan as an 
independent buffer state between the British and the Russian 
Empires. Beaconsfield's first inclination was to settle the 
problem by reinstating Yakub Khan as Amir and thus maintaining 
the "scientific frontier" created by the Treaty of Gandamak. 1 
However, upon further consideration, Beaconsfield, always 
an opportunist in this type of situation, began to consider 
how the new set of circumstances could be utilized to 
strengthen the security of India even more substantially. 
Writing to the Queen, he suggested that Britain should not be 
too hasty in withdrawing her forces from Afghanistan£ 
We have had too many fits and starts in our 
history as far as Afghanistan and Central 
Asia are concerned. We must accustom the 
world a little to the permanence and stability 
of our authority there. 
He suggested that Britain should occupy lithe strongholds" of 
Afghanistan. If Britain were to take possession of Herat, 
1 _ Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 9 Sep 1879, H & B, vi, p.479. 
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he believed she wo ul<i be in a stra tegic position to p:cevent 
any attack by ~~ussia southwards towards Herv on. the North-
west frontier of AfghaniGtan. It would also enable Britain 
to establish a direct link with Persia and bolster her against 
:~us~;ian encroachment. Beaconsfield had long felt that Persia 
constituted a weak link in British imperial defences in the 
1 ~ast and the country lay directly in the path of Russian 
expansion south. "We can, in short, if we are not in a hurry. 
consolidate your Hajesty's Empire and inflict such a check on 
any rival Power. whicn will influence the conduct of all 
Eastern Gtates~', 2 he concluded. 
'fhis was a much more forward policy towards Afghanistan 
than Beaconsfield had hitherto adopted, but the motive behind 
it remained the security of the Indian Empire. The stronger 
tone of British policy now was due not to a desire to add to 
British pos3essions but to strengthen Indian defences. A 
report from General Roberts in Kabul at the end of ~Jovember 
also seemed to indicate a need for more positive policy devel-
opments towards Afghanistan. He claimed to have discovered 
evidence of a secret treaty between the Amir and Russia 
which had been signed.after the Treaty of Berlin. Letters 
written by Generals Kaufman and 3tolietov instigating the 
1. Beaconsfield to 2alisbury, 15 Oct 1874, H & B. v, p.427. 
2. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 23 Oct 1879, ibid, vi, p.482. 
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Afghans to attack India and to incite a general Muslim rising 
there, were also discovered. It seems probable that this was 
another example of the Tsar'e lack of control over his lieut-
enants in distant Asian provinces and it is highly unlikely 
that the scheme uncovered by Roberts had official sanction. 
Nevertheless, one can hardly blame Beaconsfield for accepting 
it as concrete evidence of his worst suspicions of Russian 
intentions. If, at a time when Beaconsfield himself credited 
her with relatively peaceful intentions, RUssia really had 
been plotting to undermine British rule in India, his policy 
towards Afghanistan seemed to be completely justified. The 
QUeen need not fear a lack of strength in the Cabinet's 
1 
reaction to the news, he wrote shortly afterwards. 
In the end, nothing came of the more forward policy 
Beaconsfield was considering at the end of October 1879. 
Negotiations were begun with Persia and Beaconsfield and 
Salisbury conSidered giving Herat to her in return for a 
positive alliance with India. 2 Even the arch-imperialist 
of them all, Queen Victoria, critiaized this policy as 
involving an unwarranted extension of British repQPsibilities, 
and the approaches to Persia were abandoned. 
At this stage, it appeared that Britain would be forced 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 5 Dec 1879, M & B, vi, p.484. 
2. Ibid~ 
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to fall back upon Lytton's plan of dividing Afghanistan 
amongst the different chiefs. The Cabinet did., in fact, 
place Candahar in the hands of a chief who was to be inde-
pendent of Kabul but under ~ritish protection. With this 
additional security for the North-west frontier, it was 
proposed to let the various petty chiefs settle the division 
of the remainder among themselves. At this juncture, there 
appeared out of Turkestan a claimant to the Afghan throne in 
Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Sher Ali. Beaconsfield welcomed 
his arriVal for he was quite sure that Afghanistan as one 
independent state would be a much more effective buffer against 
Russia than a series of petty chiefdoms. Moreover, Abdul 
appeared to have the makings of the strong ruler Afghanistan 
required. Accordingly, negotiations were begun with him and 
they were still continuing when Beaconsfield left office in 
1880. 
The new Liberal ministry under the leadership of Gladstone 
determined to reverse Beaconsfield's forward policy. in Afghan-
istan and considered evacuating Candahar as part of this 
reversal. Beaconsfield, by now a very ill man, summoned the 
strength to appear in the House of Lords and~eak strongly 
against the proposal. In his last speech in the House he 
attempted a complete justification of his policy in the 
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Eastern Question, both in the Near East and Afghanistan, 
dealing in particular with Afghanistan. The letters uncovered 
by General Roberts at Kabul furnished ample evidence that his 
positive policy had been completely justified, he claimed .. 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, Britain had 
been prepared to ~rget Russian movements in Central Asia when 
war seemed to be pending but unfortunately Russia had con-
tinued to entertain designs upon Afghanistan and India. If 
Britain withdrew from Afghanistan, he continued, then Russia 
would step in on the grounds that she could not allow anarchy 
upon her borders. In Beaconsfield's eyes, there was nothing 
reprehensible in Russia's conduct. '~ussia has as good a 
right to create an Empire in Tartary as we have in India" he 
said. Nonetheless, Britain must be constantly on guard 
"against what must be looked upon as the inevitable designs 
of a very great power" in case they endangered the power of 
the British Empire. He then went on to discuss the strategic 
significance of Candahar. It was, he said, one of a number 
of places which were lithe keys of India" and he listed the 
other key points in Central Asia as Herat, Ghuznee, Merv and 
Balk. He claimed that all of them, if not essential to 
Britain, would give cause for apprehension if occupied by a 
great military power. In the past hundred years, Britai~ had 
"appropriated many strong places in the world" and "erected 
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a range of fortificationstl in seeking to retain the Empire. 
This, Beaconsfield stated, was the policy he had pursued and 
he hoped it Vlould be continued. If Britain did do so then 
"Candahar is eminently one of those places which would con-
t t . ,1 tribute to the main enance of hat emplre. 1 o~ 19 April 1881, 
only a few weeks after he had made his last plea for the 
maintenance of the Indian Empire against the Russian threat, 
Beaconsfield died. It was a fitting swansong~ 
* * * * * * * 
Posterity has judged tile Second Afghan War as unnecessary 
but the blame for the hostilities can hardly be laid upon 
Beaconsfield's shoulders. He, too, felt that the aims of his 
policy in Afghani3tan could, and should, have been achieved 
peacefully. His responsibility for the outbreak of war is 
really limited to his appointing, as Viceroy, Lytton whose 
reckless and headstrong policy actually precipitated the war. 
With this in mind, Beaconsfield's policy towards Afghanistan 
appears somewhat more reasonable than his policy in the Near 
East in 1876-8. Certainly the connection between Afgbani~tan 
and Indian security i3 a good deal less tenuous than the link 
1... Speech in the House of Lords, 4 Har 1881, Kebbe!, ii I 
pp .. 262-71. 
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Beaconsfield had tried to establish between the independence 
of Constanti~ople and the safety of the Indian Empire. An 
invasion of India through Afghanistan was hardly feasible, 
but if Russia had bean able to bring Afghanistan under its 
control. it would have been possible for them to place pressure 
upon the ~orth-west frontier. This would have enabled them to 
divert British attention from events elsewhere almost at will 
and would have been a constant source of friction between the 
two powers. There is no evidence of the Russian Foreign 
Office ever considering such a plan but the activities of 
Kaufmann and Stolietoff in Russian Turkestan, especially 
after General Roberts' discovery, did provide some justificatlon 
for Beaconsfield's fears. His outloOk was shared by a good 
number of high ranking offials in the Indian government. In 
short, his policy, while probably based upon a false under-
standing of Russian intentions, was at least reasonable. 
His policy, moreover, was consistent with the course of 
action he had advocated during the Eastern Crisis. In Beacons-
field's eyes, the threat from Russia through Afghanistan was 
a part of the same threat posed to Indian security by Russian 
expansion in ASia Minor and through European Turkey to Bulgaria. 
He had endeavoured to meet the threat in the same way, by a 
positive defence of the status quo in order to contain Russian 
expansion. In Afghanistan, as in the Near East, as in Europe 
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the basis of Beaconsfield's policy was the maintenance of the 
Empire and the preservation of British power. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION. 
Since the publication of Nonypen~ and Buckle's volumes, 
historians have tended to dismiss Beaconsfield's diplomacy as, 
in Medlicott's words, "no more than a spasmodic eXercise of 
ignorance and bellicosity.1l 1 Whatever criticisms may be 
levied at Beaconsfield's foreign policy, he deserves more 
serious treatment than that. In particular, the policies 
which he pursued during the Near Eastern crisis of 1876-1878 
and in Afghanistan in 1878-1879, appear to have been consistent. 
Moreover, they were successful in achieving the aims Beacons-
field set for them. In both cases he was endeavouring to 
maintain and improve the security of the Indian Empire in the 
face of Hussian expansion. 
International politics were to Beaconsfield power politics 
and he believed the power of Britain to depend largely upon 
her vast imperial possessions. The British Empire guaranteed 
Britain, 80 he reasoned, a vast potential of material resources 
and strategic bases allover the world. Even more important 
in Beaconsfield's eyes, however, was the tremendous amount of 
prestige the Empire afforded Britain. He perceived something 
most of his contemporaries did not by realising that prestige 
was not just a matter of sentiment but a crucial factor in 
1. W.N.Medlicott. Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiog-
raphy, p.225. 
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determining the amount of power and influence a nation could 
wield in international politics.- Thus I Britain's overseas 
emp~re was absolutely vital to her continuing power and 
prosperity. Of the Empire, Beaconsfield believed one possess-
ion to be of special value. In his eyes, India was the corner-
ston~ of the Empire and of far greater significance than 
Britain's other colonial possessions. Whatever happened, 
nothing must be allowed to jeopardize British rule there. 
Vfuen Beaconsfield assumed office in 1874, he was convinced 
that the policy of the preceding government had left Britain 
with her prestige, and therefore her power, greatly diminished. 
Gladstone's policy of remain~ng aloof from European affairs 
had lowered British influence in Europe and left Britain 
isolated in face of an ominous grouping of the three Imperial 
powers, RUSSia, Germany and Austria. As a result, Britain 
appeared weak and vulnerable to the other European powers at 
~ time when a growing threat to her Empire from Asia, partic-
ularly required her to be strong. 
This threat to the Indian Empire from Asia seemed 
obvious to Beaconsfield. By the early 1870 1 5, the vast pro-
gramme of imperial expansion undertaken by Russia following 
the Crimean settlement, had brought her to the borders of 
Afghanistan and PerSia, leaving only these two countries now 
separating Russia from India. l1oreover, RUS5~a r s repudiation 
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of the Black Sea Clauses Qf the Treaty of Paris of 1856, had 
made it possible for her to maintain a navy on the Black Sea 
and threaten' the security of Constantinople. Beaconsfield 
considered it inevitable that this great southward sweep 
by Russia would ultimately lead to a clash between the RUBsian 
and British Empires. After the repudiation of the Black Sea 
Clauses in 1871, he was certain that Russia aimed at the 
seizure of Constantinople which would give her an. outlet into 
the Mediterranean and also an entrance to Asia Minor. This, 
Beaconsfield believed, would allow Russia to threaten British 
communications with India through the Suez Canal. If Russia 
continued her advance in Central Asia, she would also soo~ 
be in, a posi tion to plae e direc t pressure upon the frontiers 
of India. In Beaconsfield's opinion, such a situation would 
leave the Indian Empire dangerously insecure. 
In 1874, Beaconsfield was determined to take positive 
action to ensure lithe coming crisis" would not adversely affect 
Britain or her Empire. If Britain was to remain a great 
imperial power, then she must act to secure her interests 
and show her strength to the world. Nonetheless. this must 
not be allowed to obscure the fact that Beaconsfield from the 
outset, conceived his policy to be one of defence and it was 
to be based upon the preservation of the status quo in the 
East. It was a policy designed to uphold and maintain the 
-141-
British Empire already in eXistence rather than to enlarge 
the Empire further. 
The first two years of Beaconsfield's ministry saw him 
seizing every possible opportunity to reassert British 
influence and advertise her imperial character. Britain's 
unsolicited participation in the War Scare of May 1875. when 
she added her own offices to the Russian efforts to mediate 
between Germany and France, emphasised his conviction that 
Britain was a European power and should act in that capacity. 
A clear warning of the esteem in which Britain held her Indian 
Empire and her determination to defend it at all costs, was 
issued with the purchase of the Suez Canal shares and the 
announcement of the Royal Titles Bill. In both cases, Beacons-
field, speaking in the House, emphasised that his government 
had intended its actions to convey precisely this warning. 
Then, wi th the revolt in Herzegovina in- 1875 and the 
complications consequent upon Turkey's failure to squash it, 
the Eastern Question was re-opened. It immediately claimed 
Beaconsfield's full attention. The position of Turkey in 
Europe was, of course, a European question and Beaconsfield 
was always careful to emphasise that he considered Turkey's 
presence in Europe essential to the maintenance of the balance 
of power and the preservation of European peace. There were 
strong Palmerstonian overtones to this view. BeaCOnsfield's 
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main worry, however, was the use Russia might make of thie 
fresh crisis to press southwards through Europe to Constanti-
nople and through Asia Minor towards the Suez thus, in his 
opinion, endangering Indian security. He felt all his earlier 
suspicions of Russian intentions in this direction to have 
been confirmed by Russia's demands for direct action by the 
great powers to settle the situation and was convinced that 
Constantinople, the "key to India", was now Russia's objective. 
For the next two years, his policy was designed to prevent 
the Russians ever gaining control of the city and to ensure 
that Turkey remained an effective buffer between Russia and 
the Suez Canal in Asia Minor. With the signing of the Cyprus 
Convention and the success of Britain at the Berlin Congress, 
Beaconsfield felt his aims had been aChieved. "The threatened 
injury to the British Empire has been averted", he told the 
House of Lords upon his return from Berlin.' 
The Congress was barely over when, BeaconSfield found 
himself faced with a new crisis in Afghanistan. It was not 
welcome, for Beaconsfield was sure it had been needlessly 
precipitated by Lytton's headstrong actions. Nonetheless, he 
determined almost immediately to make use of the situation. to 
strengthen the North-west frontier of India. liThe intrigues 
of Russia determined yr. Majesty's Govt. to secure the gates 
1. 18 July 1878, Kebbel, 1i, p.180. 
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of India. They have accomplished their purpose", he wrote 
to the Queen after the successful completion of the first 
1 
campaign of the Second Afghan War. In Afghanistan, as in 
the Near East, Beaconsfield's concern was with the security 
of India against the Russians. Admittedly he never attached 
quite the same significance to the Afghan crisis as he did to 
the situation in the Near East. He was confident that Russia 
had been, for the moment, checked by the Berlin Treaty which 
had not only halted Russian encroachments into the Ottoman 
Empire but had also signified the final breakup of the Drei-
kaiserbund and a vast increase in British influence in Europe. 
In the light of this, he quite correctly considered it unlikely 
that the Russians would risk anything which would lead to a 
confrontation with Britain •. Beaconsfield's attention had 
swung towards Europe by this stage, and he was concerned 
above all to maintain the gains, influence and prestige which 
Britain had made in Europe at the Congress. 
Despite this, Beaconsfield did view his policy in Afghan-
istan as consistent with the poliCy which he had pursued in the 
Near East. In his speech at Guildhall in 1878, he clearly 
linked the defence of the North-west frontier with the defence 
of India from an attack through ASia Ninor, pointing out that 
1. Beaconsfield to Victoria, 6 Dec 1878, M & B, vi, p.397. 
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it was no use guarding against the latter eventuality and not 
the former. Beaconsfield always envisaged the creation of a 
line of defences against Russian advances stretching from 
constantinople to the borders of Tibet. He spoke on a number 
of occasions of Britain's "range of fortifications" which 
1 protected the Indian En!pire. It was as a part of this scheme 
that he considered concluding an alliance with Persia towards 
the end of 1879 for he was always aware that Persia was a 
weak link in this chain of defence. His policies in both the 
Near East and in Afghani6t~ must be viewed primarily as 
attempts to consolidate this barrier of neutral territory 
against Russian encroachment. 
If it would be incorrect to criticise Beaconsfield's 
Eastern policy on the grounds that it was inconsistent, it 
remains true that by and large his policy in the East was 
unrealistic and misdirected. Beaconsfield, it is true, was 
largely successful in realiSing the aims of his diplomacy 
in the East. He did check the RUssians in their advance 
towards Constantinople and into Asia Minor and he did establish 
British paramountcy in Afghanistan although at the cost of 
British lives. Moreover, the actiollS of Britain in the Eastern 
QUestion were instrumental in raising British prestige and 
1. For instance, Speech on Suez purchase, 8 Feb 1875, 3 Hansard 
227 Col.l00j Speech against the evacuation of Candahar, 4 
Mar 1881, M & ~ vi, pp.604-5. 
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influence in Europe to n-ew heights and in this context Beacons-
field's poliCy did benefit Britain substantially. Neither can 
one criticise too harshly his handling of British diplomacy. 
Throughout, he displayed a great aptitude for seizing oppor-
tunities as they came, and a readiness to adjust to changing 
circumstances. Considering the fact that his very forthright 
policy of threatening Russia with war in the early months of 
1878 was based mainly upon bluff, he displayed both great 
courage and ability in judging just how much pressure he could 
exert without having his bluff called. Yet, when all this has 
been said, it still remains true that Beaconsfield's policy in 
the East was founded upon a misconception of the Whole situat-
ion there. 
The basic premise of his policy in the East assumed 
Russian expansion to pose a serious threat to Indian security, 
but nO evidence has ever been discovered to indicate that 
Russia ever did have any intention of menaCing British rule 
in India. This was the great flaw. Superficially, his policy 
in Afghanistan at least, appears quite reasonable. If Russia 
control~ed Afghanistan she would indeed be in contact with 
India along her North-west frontier. But if Russia had taken 
over Afghanistan, her own frontiers would have been much more 
dangerously over-extended and vulnerable than those of India. 
It was wildly improbable that she would ever be able to mount 
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a seriouB attack upon India from this quarter. Beaconsfield's 
policy in the Near East appears even less sensible. His coo-
tention that Constantinople was the "key to India lt at the very 
least indicates a lamentable lack of geographical knowledge, 
very probably a result of drawing sweeping conclusions from 
small scale maps. The same is true of his concept of a 
"range of fortifications". Actually, the distances and terrain 
involved made the establishment of such a system of defence 
quite out of the question and it was really quite untrue to 
suggest that Britain had achieved it. 
It is essential to view Beaconsfield's mistakes within the 
con.text of the timeS 'of his ministry and to aCknowledge that 
his lot was hardly an easy one. His misunderstandings of the 
situation were shared by many others, often by men such as Sir 
Henry Elliot and Lord Lytton whose knowledge of local circum-
stances placed them i~ a better position than Beaconsfield to 
make an accurate judgment. Horeover, much of his lack of 
knowledge can be attributed to the inadequate and inaccurate 
information he received from his subordinates. This was 
particularly so in the Near East, where it even appe~s possible 
that Elliot may have deliberately withheld information. 1 It 
must also be remembered that Beaconsfield was seventy-two 
years old in 1874 and his health, poor then, deteriorated 
1. Seton-Watson, pp.65-7. 
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through his ministry. He was almost constantly ill during 
the critical year of 1877 and yet was forced to carry the 
responsibility for foreign policy virtually on his own. 
However courageous and industrious Beaconsfield- may have been, 
he simply did not possess at this stage in his remarkable 
career, the energy and capacity for sheer hard work necessary 
to come to grips with the complex situation with which he was 
faced. 
Yet, when all these extenuating circumstances have been 
taken into account, the misjudgements involved in Beaconsfield's 
Eastern policy remain at least partly the fault of Beaconsfield 
himself. However hardened and cynical his thirty-seven years 
of political life before 1874 had made him, Beaconsfield 
remained a romantic at heart. He was convinced that the Indian 
Empire, which he revered as the greatest of Britain's imperial 
possessions, was endangered. He was equally certain that he 
was the man to save it. As a consequence, he tended both to 
dramatise his own role and achievements and to grossly over-
simplify the situation with which he was faced. His suspicions 
of Russian intentions towards India blinded him to the true 
situation in the Balkans and to the obstacles in the way of 
any Russian threat towards India. Beaconsfield's policy in 
the East was neither inconsistent nor unsuccessful, but it was 
largely unnecessary. 
* * • * * * • * * 
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The conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that 
Beaconsfield's policy in the East, 1874-1880, shows no 
basic inconsistency. However, it was based upon an in-
adequate understanding of the situation, both in the Near 
East and in Central Asia. Ironically, this did not prevent 
Beaconsfield from achieving anything of value. Britain's 
role in settling the Eastern Question brought a tremendous 
increase in British prestige and influence in Europe. The 
war in Afghanistan, if nothing else, emphasised the imperial 
pre-occupations of Britain. Whatever other mistakes Beacons-
field may have made, he was correct in believing that the 
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